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THE NEW NUISANCE: AN ANTIDOTE TO
WETLAND LOSS, SPRAWL, AND
GLOBAL WARMING
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN*

Abstract: Marking the fifteenth anniversary of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council-the modern U.S. Supreme Court's seminal regulatory
takings decision-this Article surveys Lucas's impact upon regulations
that restrict wedand filling, sprawling development, and the emission of
greenhouse gases. The Lucas Court set forth a new categorical rule of
governmental liability for regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land, but also established a new defense that draws upon the
states' common law of nuisance and property. Unexpectedly, that defense
has taken on a life of its own-forming what this Article calls the new nuisance doctrine. As this Article explains, nuisance is new in at least two important ways. First, it has taken on a new posture, evolving from defense,
to offense, to catalyst for legislative change. Second, nuisance has taken
on new substance, triggered in part by Lucas's explicit recognition that
"changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so."
INTRODUCTION: FROM NEW PROPERTY TO NEW NUISANCE

In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the foundational modern case on regulatory takings, Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council.1
In holding that a state law forbidding construction in certain coastal
zones required compensation, the Court created a new total takings
categorical rule, requiring governments to compensate landowners
whenever regulation "deprives land of all economically beneficial use."2
Just three years before, Hurricane Hugo had struck the very island in
dispute-the Isle of Palms-leading to thirty-five fatalities and $7 bil-

* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of Florida,
Levin College of Law. LL.M., Columbia University;, J.D., University of Colorado; B.A., Middlebury College. I am grateful for the research of Stephen Fellows, Heather A. Halter, and
Jonathan P. Huels.
I Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1026-27 (1992).
2 Id.
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lion in damage.3 Drawing upon this experience, South Carolina presented evidence that undeveloped lands provide valuable protection
against coastal storms and hurricanes, and that for "roughly half of the
last 40 years, all or part of [the Lucas] property was part of the beach or
flooded twice daily."4 Rejecting such evidence, the Court accepted the
premise that oceanfront lands are "valueless" in their natural state.5 In
so doing, the Court gave little weight to the state legislature's finding
that coastal development must be regulated to prevent harm to the
community.6 The Court reasoned, "[because] such a justification can
be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of
whether the legislature has a stupid staff."7
The Court tempered its new categorical rule with a new defense,
planting the seed for the new nuisance doctrine that is the focus of this
Article. Under the Lucas defense, regulations that deprive property of
all economically beneficial use "cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in ...the restrictions that

background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."8 The Courtalso provided an important reminder that nuisance law is fundamentally evolutionary,
such that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what
was previously permissible no longer so."9 As Justice Kennedy noted in
concurrence, "the State should not be prevented from enacting new
regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions."10
This Article unpacks what I call the new nuisance doctrine, applying it to the environmental challenges posed by wetland destruction,
sprawling development patterns, and global warming." Overall, Lvcas
triggered an unanticipated revitalization of the link between property
and torts. By explicitly measuring the contours of property rights
against the evolving backdrop of nuisance-primarily a tort doctrinethe Court restored an important degree of flexibility to property

3 S.C. STATE CLIMATOLOGY OFFICE, SOUTH CAROLINA HURRICANE CLIMATOLOGY,
http://www.dnr.sc.gov/climte/sco/Tropics/hurricanes._affecting-sc.php (last visited Sept.
18, 2007).
4Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1038-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 1007, 1009, 1018-19 (majority opinion).
6Id. at 1020-26.
7Id. at 1025 n.12.
8Id. at 1029.
9Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
10 Id. at 1035 (KennedyJ., concurring).
11 See infra notes 244-536 and accompanying text.
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rights. 12 Moreover, the Lucas defense weakened the insularity of property rights, instead balancing the rights of the individual against the
interests of the community1 3 This Article suggests that Lucas initiated
a revolution in the way we think about property. Such a change has
not been seen, perhaps, since 1964 when Charles Reich published The
New Property.14 More than four decades and hundreds of citations
later, The New Property has been recognized as a seminal work that has
changed our conception of property. 15
This Article contends that the new nuisance doctrine of Lucas has
moved from defense, to offense, to legislative catalyst. As others have
noted, Lucas left a legacy surprisingly favorable to governmental defendants in the form of a new "categorical" defense.' 6 I add to this
discovery by tracing the spillover effect of Lucas beyond the bounds of
regulatory takings defense, into the realm of affirmative claims for
common law nuisance.1 7 That is, as new ecological and other learning
begins to connect the dots between cause and effect, more aggressive
nuisance claims, facilitated by Lucas, will become viable. Even more
far-reaching-as nuisance liability becomes more likely in growing
areas of study such as global warming-industry leaders themselves
have begun to call for uniform, federal legislation that may limit how
their property may be used.' 8 These are unexpected, proregulatory
developments, stimulated at least in part by the purportedly antiregulatory Lucas decision.
Part I examines the modern property rights movement, with its
emphasis upon individual rights relatively unfettered by public interest
regulation. 19 Part II describes how the Supreme Court's environmental
cynicism led it to create a new total takings categorical rule in Lucas,
which is tempered by the new nuisance defense.2 0 The discussion also
roots Lucas in a geophysical context, between the bookends of Hurri12

See infra notes 259-275 and accompanying text.

13 See infra notes 259-275 and accompanying text.
14 See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Pmperty, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964).
15See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv.

751, 760 (1996) (describing The New Property as "one of the genuinely original breakthroughs in legal thought" and listing it as the fourth most-cited law review article with 728
citations); see also infra notes 211-213 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 244-258 and accompanying text (discussing the work of Professors
Michael Blumm, Richard Lazarus, and others); infra notes 259-275 and accompanying
text.
17See infra notes 276-281 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 503-536 and accompanying text.

19See infra notes 28-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 83-120 and accompanying text.

2o
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cane Hugo and Hurricane Katrina.2 1 Noting the continuing vulnerability of the southeastern coastal region to severe storms, this Section
ponders whether the Court would decide Lucas differently today in
22
light of new learning on wetlands, hurricanes, and global warming.
Part III places the Lucas decision into historical context, delineating
periods of roughly thirty to fifty years during which either private rights
or the community welfare claimed a position of ascendancy. 23 As discussed in Part IV, after Lucas, nuisance law is "new" in two critical respects. 24 First, it has developed from a defense to takings liability into

an offensive claim for common law nuisance, and beyond to a catalyst
for legislative action. 25 Second, nuisance has a new substantive aspect.
As the Lucas Court made clear, the doctrine should evolve in conformity with changed circumstances or new knowledge. 26 Part V considers
the applicability of the new nuisance doctrine to three of the most crucial environmental problems of our time-wetland destruction, sprawl27
ing development patterns, and global warming.
I.

THE PROPERTY RIGHTS IMBALANCE

Rights are not the languageof democracy. Compromise is what democracy is
about. Rights are the language of freedom, and are absolute because their
role is to protect our liberty. By using the absolute power of freedom to accomplish reforms of democracy, we have undemined democracy and diminished ourfreedom.
-Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense: How Law Is
8
Suffocating America 2

In a healthy society, there is a rough give-and-take between individual autonomy and community well-being. For centuries, nuisance
law has been assigned the task of balancing such competing interests,
weighing the common law property rights of individuals against those
21 See infra notes
2 See infra notes
23 See infra notes
24 See infra notes

121-151
121-151
152-243
244-311
2 See infra notes 259-284
26 See infra notes 285-311
27 See infra notes 312-536
28 PHiLIP

K.

and accompanying
and accompanying
and accompanying
and accompanying
and accompanying
and accompanying
and accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
text.
text.
text.

HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:

How

LAW Is SUFFOCATING

168 (1994) (condemning modern society as excessively bureaucratic and lawdriven). Although the author's criticism was directed at what he perceives to be excessive
governmental regulation, it might be applied with equal force to the excesses of modern
property rights advocates.
AMERICA
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of the neighboring landowner or community. More recently, statutes
designed to protect public health, safety, welfare, and the environment have supplemented (or even supplanted) nuisance law. Both
nuisance law and public interest legislation are, at their core, enterprises involving balance and compromise.
Increasingly, however, advocates have employed the language of
"rights" to lend moral heft to their side of the scale.29 In 1985, Professor
Richard Epstein laid the groundwork for expanding the constitutional
dimension of property, arguing that individual rights should be limited
by a governmental police power no broader than the power of eminent
domain.3 0 In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court embraced Epstein's philosophy, at least in part, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.3 Critics of Epstein and Lucas assert that "[n]otwithstanding the typical
rhetoric of the takings debate, government officials are defenders of
property rights."32 Arguing for a more evenhanded application of
"rights" language, these critics contend that "[a]n aggressive use of the
Takings Clause to undermine land use controls does not promote
property rights generally, but rather promotes the property rights of a
33
select few at the expense of the majority of property owners."
Today, the absolutist language of rights-particularly when linked
to the constitutional regulatory takings doctrine-has the potential to
stifle the discussion of important social and environmental policies. As
commentators have warned, unyielding "rights talk" should be used
with care to avoid the suppression of democratic debate.3 4 This Part
29 See infra notes 36-82 and accompanying text.
30 Se RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 332 (1985) (asking "what minimum of additional power... must be added for the
state to become more than a voluntary protective association and to acquire the exclusive use
of force within its territory?" and concluding that "the only additional power needed is the
state's right to force exchanges of property rights [through eminent domain] that leave individuals with rights more valuable than those they have been deprived of").

31 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citing to Epstein's work
for general propositions of regulatory takings law). Epstein was also one of the authors of a
Lucas amicus brief filed on behalf of the Institute for Justice. See id. at 1005. For a discussion of Lucas, see infra notes 83-151 and accompanying text.
32 DOUGLAS KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: DEFENDING TAKINGS
CHALLENGES TO LAND USE REGULATIONS 9 (2000), available at http://communityrights.org/
legaresources/Handbook/HBintro.asp. See generally ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE (1995), available at http://www.environ-mentprobe.
org/enviroprobe/pridon/index.html.
33 KENDALL ET AL., supra note 32, at 10.
4 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (arguing that modern political discourse focuses excessively on
rights to the exclusion of duties and responsibilities).
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surveys the modern property rights movement, highlighting the techniques it uses to shape public opinion in a manner solicitous of private
35
landowners and distrustful of public interest regulation.
A. Supersizing Property Rights
The modern property rights movement is an important social
phenomenon, and it would be little exaggeration to consider it a manifestation of the American propensity toward "supersizing."36 Property
rights-particularly those relating to real property-have expanded in
37
at least three important dimensions.
First, the size of homes-perhaps the most important type of real
property-has been increasing over time. 38 Between 1987 and 2001,
the size of the average new home in the United States increased by
over twenty percent, from 1900 square feet to 2300 square feet. 39 By

2003, approximately twenty percent of new homes exceeded 3000
35See infra notes 36-82 and accompanying text. As one who teaches Property in the law
school curriculum, I must acknowledge that property professors may contribute to this
distrust of governmental regulation. As Professor Myrl Duncan has written, the traditional
"bundle of sticks" metaphor may discount the value of public interest regulation:
One individual's interest in land cannot be defined without taking into account the interests of neighbors and the larger human and natural communities. For example, filling (or draining) a wetland might be considered a property interest belonging to the owner of tract on which it lays-a stick in his
bundle. Yet in wiping out the wetland the owner affects drainage on the rest
of his land-his whole bundle of sticks-and may well affect the drainage of
his neighbors' lands, represented by their bundles.... [F]rom a social and
ecological perspective, the [bundle of sticks] metaphor presents a false reality, one that cannot be squared with the values that underlie the present day
understanding of what it means to own land.
Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32
ENVTL. L. 773, 775-76 (2002).
6 The word "supeisize" appeared in the 2003-05 edition of Webster's New Millennium
Dictionaryof English defined as a verb meaning "to increase the size of something ordered,
esp. a food item" and as an adjective meaning "extremely large; enormous." See WEBSTER'S
NEW MILLENNIUM DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Barbara Ann Kipfer ed., version 0.9.6 2005)

(online edition), available at http://dictionary.reference.com. The word received considerable media attention when it was used in the title of Morgan Spurlock's 2004 documentary, Super Size Me: A Film of Epic Proportions. See A.O. Scott, Film Review: When All Those Big
Macs Bite Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at E18 (describing film as an "affable, muckraking
documentary").
37 See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
39
Jennifer Evans-Cowley, McMansions: Supersized Houses, Supersized Regulations, TIERI
GRANDE, Jan. 2005, available at http://recenter.tamu.edu/TGrande/voll2-1/1713.html
(citing a 2002 study by the National Association of Home Builders).
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square feet in size. 40 Simultaneously, household size has decreased,
41
thereby inflating the average per capita square footage of homes.
Second, the profile of property owners has changed over time,
increasingly including individuals with expansive property portfolios
encompassing more than the traditional family home. 42 In 2005, for
example, second home sales (including vacation homes and invest43
ment property) comprised forty percent of the residential market.
Similarly, many farms today are owned by large agribusinesses, rather
than by families: between 1900 and 1990, the average farm grew from
147 to 461 acres, as the percentage of farmers in the national labor
force declined from 38% to 2.6%. 44
Finally, property rights have become "supersized" in terms of political influence. 45 Numerous advocacy groups oppose government
regulation that restricts the use of private property.46 Following the
blueprint of Richard Epstein, property advocates argue:
[The] regulatory bureaucracy has become so large, unaccountable, and powerful that Congress effectively has forfeited meaningful oversight.... This leaves victimized private citizens, especially smaller landowners and business
persons, with the near-insurmountable burden of challeng-

40 Id. This represents an almost 100% increase in large home construction between
1988 (11% of new homes exceeded 3000 square feet) and 2003 (20% of new homes exceeded 3000 square feet). Id. (citing U.S. Census Bureau data).
41 Id. (citing U.S. Census Bureau data showing that average household size decreased
from 3.11 persons in 1970 to 2.59 persons in 2000).
42 See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
43 Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, Second Home Sales Hit Another Record in
2005; Market Share Rises (Apr. 5, 2006), available at http://www.realtor.org/press-room/
news releases/2006/secondhomesales05.htnil.
44 A History of American Agriculture: Farmers & the Land, http://www.agclassroom.
org/gan/timeline/farmersjland.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
45 See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
46 Critics have dubbed as the "Takings Project" the aggressive use of the regulatory takings doctrine to oppose property regulation. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The
Takings Project:A CriticalAnalysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far,25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 509, 510-11 (1998) (identifying as "blueprint" for takings doctrine Richard Epstein's
Takings, Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain). They argue that the Project has
been supported by an annual budget of approximately $15 million, supplied by prodevelopment foundations, associations, attorneys, and individuals. See id. at 539-45. Kendall and
Lord assert that the Project's budget is dedicated, in part, to the staging of meetings, workshops, and all-expense paid seminars for judges. See id. at 546-49. See generally Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of "PublicInterest Law," 52 UCLA
L. REv. 1223 (2005).
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ing the government's intrusive land-use control in the
courts.

47

Accordingly, Epsteinian reformers promote an agenda expanding the
force of property rights, thereby seeking to invalidate many modern
health, safety, and environmental regulations.a4
B. SanctifyingProperty Owners
Our God-given property rights are being stolenfrom us little by little.

-The Constitution Party of Oregon 49
The property rights movement has derived much of its force
from a careful choice of rhetoric. 50 Despite the modern "supersizing"
of property rights and landowners, advocates strategically employ language that evokes the sympathetic image of small landowners as a
vulnerable "David" struggling against an oppressive governmental
"Goliath." 51 At least two rhetorical techniques have been employed in
an attempt to advance the position of property owners who desire to
52
be free from government regulation.
First, property advocates sanctify landowners by linking the goal
of unfettered land use to other noble causes.53 The Defenders of
47

M. David Stirling, Move over Saddam: Overzealous Regulators Also Threaten Freedom PLF

SENTRY, Feb. 21, 2003 (on file with author).
4 Kendall & Lord, supra note 46, at 513. As an example of this increasing political influence, voters in two western states, Oregon and Arizona, have recently passed "regulatory
takings initiatives" that require state and local governments to pay compensation or waive
land use regulations that reduce the value of real property by any amount. See Regulatory

Takings Ballot MeasuresAcross America: Attack of the Measure 37 Clones, Am.

PLANNING ASS'N,

Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.planning.org/legislation/measure37/. These initiatives have
been backed by prominent property rights groups such as the PLF and Oregonians in
Action. See id.; Press Release, Pac. Legal Found., PLF Asks Oregon Supreme Court to Uphold Measure 37 (Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/?mvcTask= press
Releases&id=364; Yes on 37, Measure 37: Restoring Fairness and Balance in Oregon's
Land Use Laws, http://measure37.com/why.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
49 Press Release, The Constitution Party of Or., Petition Drive for Recall, Judge James PAC
(Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Petition Drive for Recall], available at http://www.constutionpartyoregon.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=artide&sid=85.
This
statement was made by Constitution Party of Oregon to garner support for an effort to recall
Oregon trial court Judge MaryJames, who decided that Measure 37, an Oregon property rights
initiative, was unconstitutional. See id. See generally MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Serv., No.
05C10444 (Or. Cir. CL Marion County Oct. 14, 2005), rev' 130 P.3d 308 (2006).
50 See infra notes 51-82 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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Property Rights, for example, compares its mission to that of the civil
rights movement: "Just as segregation led to the civil rights movement
in the 1960s, government intrusion on property rights-largely in the
name of protecting the environment-has sparked a new crusade to
protect an individual's right to use and own all forms of and interests
in private property."54 Similarly, the Washington Legal Foundation's
chief legal counsel explains, "I look upon us as the bearers of the
torch of the civil rights movement ....

I see us as successors to Martin

Luther King and Thurgood Marshall." 55 Other advocates search for
an even higher moral ground, describing the protection of property
rights in religious terms. The Constitution Party of Oregon, for example, sought to recall a state judge who had held unconstitutional a
voter approved property rights initiative, complaining that "[olur
God-given property rights are being stolen from us little by little, and
unless we take action now, there will remain little left to us but the
priveledge [sic] of paying property taxes." 56
As a second method of sanctifying landowners, advocates employ
a victimization technique, choosing particularly sympathetic landowners as clients and portraying them as martyrs for their cause. 57 For
example, the Pacific Legal Foundation (the "PLF")58 took up the ap-

peal of an ailing widow before the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1997
case Suitum v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency. 59 In its press release de54 Kendall & Lord, supra note 46, at 540 n.133 (quoting Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990s PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 24 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995)). Marzulla is the founder and president of Defenders of Property Rights, an organization that describes itself as "[t] he only
national public-interest legal foundation dedicated exclusively to the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights in property." See Defenders of Property Rights Website (last
visited Jan. 3, 2006) (website no longer active, hard copy on file with author).
55 Kendall & Lord, supra note 46, at 540 n.135 (quoting Richard Perez-Pena, A Rights
Movement That Emergesfrom the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at B5).
56 See Petition Drive for Recall, supra note 49.
57 See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
5' The Pacific Legal Foundation is a prodevelopment, nonprofit legal foundation that
has been a "leading force" in the litigation campaign for private property rights. Kendall &
Lord; supra note 46, at 539-40. PLF terms itself a "representative in the courts for Americans who have grown weary of overregulation by big government, over-indulgence by the
courts, and excessive interference in the American way of life." Pacific Legal Foundation,
About Us, http://pacificlegal.org/?mvcTask=about (last visited Aug. 11, 2007).
59 Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 727 (1997); Petitioner's Brief
on the Merits, Suitum, 520 U.S. 725 (No. 96-243) (filed by PLF attorneys), 1996 WL
695505. The Agency's land use planning process was challenged more recently in TahoeSierra Preservation Counci4 Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331-32
(2002), where the court rejected a claim that moratoria prohibiting virtually all development for a thirty-two month period constitute a categorical taking.
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scribing Suitum's challenge before the Court to land use regulations
promulgated by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the PLF referred to its client as "a wheelchair-bound old widow who is rapidly
losing her sight."60 To explain its client's twelve year delay in seeking a
building permit, the PLF argued:
In 1972, John and Bernadine Suitum bought an 18,300
square foot lot in a residential subdivision in Incline Village,
not far from Lake Tahoe. The only reason why hers is the last
lot that has not yet been developed is because Mrs. Suitum's
6
late husband spent the last years of his life battling illness. '

Similarly in 2006, in the Supreme Court case Rapanos v. United
States, the PLF represented a Michigan commercial developer who
drained and filled wetlands without applying for the requisite federal
permit under the Clean Water Act, proceeding in defiance of several
federal cease and desist orders. 62 The PLF portrayed its client sympathetically, describing him as "a 70-year-old Michigan grandfather who
for nearly two decades has fought overzealous government prosecutors seeking prison time and more than $10 million in fees and fines
because he failed to get a federal permit before moving soil on his
63
own property."
60James S. Burling, Widow Suitum Fights a "StrangeDodrin4" FEDERALIST Soc'Y, 2001
(on file with author).
61Id.
62 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2238-39 (2006) (KennedyJ., concurring);

Petioner's Reply Brief, Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (No. 04-1034) (filed by PLF attorneys),
2005 WL 914477.
63Press Release, Pac. Legal Found., Supreme Court to Hear Landmark Wetlands Case:

PLF Asks High Court to Set Wetlands Law Straight (Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter PLF Wetlands Press Release], available at http://pacificlegal.org/?mvcTask=pressReleases&id=
283. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit described Rapanos in less sympathetic
terms. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded
sub. nom, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). In observing that Rapanos had been displeased by the
report of his own consultant, Dr. Goff, which found between forty-eight and fifty-eight
acres of protected wetlands on one of Rapanos' commercial properties, the court noted:
Upset by the report, Mr. Rapanos ordered Dr. Goff to destroy both the report
and map, as well as all references to Mr. Rapanos in Dr. Goff's files. However,
Dr. Goff was unwilling to do so. Mr. Rapanos stated he would "destroy" Dr.

Goff if he did not comply, claiming that he would do away with the report and
bulldoze the site himself, regardless of Dr. Goff's findings.
Id. CompareJ. David Breemer, The Wsdom of Growth: What Can CaliforniaLearnfrom a Recent
Property Rights Proposition in Oregon-the State Long Viewed As an Anti-Sprawl Mecca?, SACRABEE, Dec. 12, 2004 (PLF staff attorney criticizes local forest ordinance, complaining
"[a]ll Thomas and Doris Dodd wanted to do was build a retirement home on 40 acres of
MENTO
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The victimization technique has not been confined to individual
landowners, but has been applied to large corporations as well. 64 In

attempting to portray Wal-Mart as the victim of city planning, the PLF
asserted in a press release that "city officials' relentless attacks on WalMart [represent] paternalistic poli[cies] that do[] nothing but deny
entry-level employment opportunities to those who need them the
most; an attempt to keep out basic goods at affordable prices; and an
assault on the right of Wal-Mart to do business." 65 The PLF concludes,
"Free markets and freedom of choice: These American values are the
true victims of this war on the Wal-Marts of this world. Consumers
must ... tell their city representatives to stop discriminating against
66
businesses, large and small. It's the American thing to do."
C. Demonizing the Public Interest
[W7etlands regulations, like the Endangered Species Act, have been used to
rob citizens of the use of millions of acres ofprivate land.
67
-Jane Chastain, How "Wetlands" Threaten Freedom

As a corollary to the sanctification of landowners, property advocates try to diminish the importance of the public interest. 68 Drawing
support from those who criticize "big government," advocates conflate
environmental regulation with the size of government. 69 Such rhetoric taps into the privatization movement that seeks to replace numerous government programs with private sector operations. 70 In recent
times, the call for privatization has influenced such stalwart governland they purchased in 1983.... But the county wanted the land as a forest preserve, so it
passed an ordinance banning construction on the Dodd's property, destroying their
American dream"), available at http://pacificlegal.org/?mvcTask=opinion&id=377, with
Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying Dodds' claim
that application of zoning ordinance worked a regulatory taking, in part because the landowners' own six-year delay in pursuing the construction of their home defeated their claim
to reasonable, investment-backed expectations).
61 See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
6 PaulJ. Beard II, Op-Ed., In Defense of Wal-Mart, CAPrrALISM, Oct. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.pacificlegal.org/?mvcTask=opinion&id= 390.
66

Id.

67 Jane Chastain, How "Wetlands" Threaten Freedom, WORLDNETDAILY, June 29, 2006,

http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=50830
(describing petitioners
in Rapanos as "modern-day freedom fighters" who "fought the federal government for the
right to develop land they owned in the state of Michigan").
68 See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
70 See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1165 2007

1166

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 48:1155

ment programs as welfare, Medicare, and Social Security. Even the
conduct of war has been privatized to some extent. 71 Supporters of
both privatization and strong individual property rights distrust-and
at times, even scorn-government regulation conducted in the name
72
of the public interest.
At least two techniques promote the demonization of the public
interest. 73 First, property advocates portray the government as a bully.
In Rapanos, for example, the PLF asserted, "Mr. Rapanos' case is about
federal power, not protecting wetlands. Federal officials have been exploiting the Clean Water Act to bully and take land and money from
property owners for far too long."74 Likewise, property groups have
variously criticized land use regulations as "[the embodiment of the]
selfish demands of established neighborhood groups or single issue
environmental constituencies" 75 and as "nothing more than an attempt
to control at the federal level how and where people live, work, and
76
travel by depriving homeowners and small businesses of choice."
Large corporations seeking a more liberal regulatory environment have
employed similar tactics. For example, Wal-Mart has cast local zoning
regulations affecting its stores as tantamount to Nazi book burning:; in
77
the 1930s.
71 See Greg Guma, Privatizing War, COMMON DREAMS NEWS C-m., July 7, 2004, available
at http://www.commondreanis.org/viewsO4/0707-14.htm. In a progressive critique of privatization, Guma notes that:

[d]uring the first Gulf War, about two percent of U.S. military personnel were
private workers. As of 2003, it had reached 10 percent. The Pentagon employs
more than 700,000 private contractors, and at least $33 billion of the $416 billion in military spending overwhelmingly approved by the Senate [in June
2004] will go to [private military corporations].
Id. See generally Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The PrivatizationofPunishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REv. 879 (2004).
72 See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
73 See infranotes 74-82 and accompanying text.
74 PLF Wetlands Press Release, supra note 63 (quoting Reed Hopper, principal PLF attorney).
75 Brief of the National Association of Home Builders & the International Council of
Shopping Centers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *6, Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003
(No. 91-453) [hereinafter NAHB Lucas Brief], 1991 WL 11004084.
76 Property Rights and "Smart Growth" Policies, Defenders of Property Rights Website
(last visited Jan. 3, 2006) (website no longer active, hard copy on file with author) (criticizing "smart growth" regulations as "stifl[ing] property rights, economic development, and
civil rights" and "den[ying] the dream of home ownership").
77 See WAL-MART WATCH, SHAMELESS: How WAL-MART Buuiis ITS WAY INTO COMMUNrrIES ACROSS AMERICA 17 (2005),

available at http://wahnartwatch.com/img/features/

bully-report/bully-report.pif. In response to a ballot referendum in Flagstaff, Arizona opposing the construction of a new Wal-Mart store, the company placed an ad in the Arizona
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As a second method of demonizing the public interest, property
advocates employ a "no harm" technique, denying that the actions of
individual landowners have adverse consequences upon the community
and its natural environment. 78 In Suitum, for example, the PLF complained that government regulators "never presented any evidence that
there would be any environmental harm [to the Lake Tahoe Basin] if
Mrs. Suitum is allowed to build the properly constructed modest retirement home of her dreams." 79 Similarly, in Lucas, the National Association of Home Builders (the "NAHB") submitted an amicus brief in
support of landowner/developer Lucas, denying that the development
of certain coastal land would cause any harm.8° The NAHB argued, "As
the united voice of the home building industry in America, the NAHB
cannot let pass the central idea in the legislation before this Court, i.e.,
that there is something so nefarious about the building of a home that
home construction can be condemned as a nuisance."81 Although petitioner Lucas developed expensive homes in one of the nation's
wealthiest communities, the NAHB portrayed his actions as both harmless and noble: "In an economic era when people find themselves compelled to seek large packing crates for shelter, there seems something
oddly surreal in condemning the construction of homes as a nuisance
which is so heinous that it can be prevented without any thought of
82
compensating the landowner."

Daily Sun, featuring a photo of a 1933 Nazi book burning in Berlin, with the caption, "Should
we let government tell us what we can read? ... So why should we allow local government to
limit where we shop? Or how much of a store's floor space can be used to sell groceries? ...
Choiceis a freedom worth keeping." See id.
78 See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
79 Burling, supra note 60. Contra Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307-08 (recounting how
"[t]he lake's unsurpassed beauty ... is the wellspring of its undoing" and noting that the
.upsurge of development in the area has caused 'increased nutrient loading of the lake
largely because of the impervious coverage of land in the Basin resulting from that development'").
80 See generally NAHB Lucas Brief, supra note 75. The parties to the litigation had stipulated to the contrary. In particular, for purposes of the litigation, petitioner Lucas stipulated the following about the subject "beach/dune area of South Carolina's shores":
[It] is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new construction contributes, inter alia, to the erosion and destruction of this public
resource; and that discouraging new construction in close proximity to the
beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C.
1991)).
81 NAHB Lucas Brief, supra note 75, at *4.
82 Id.
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COASTAL COUNCIL: THROUGH THE EYE
OF THE HURRICANE

LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA

This Part describes how the U.S. Supreme Court's environmental
cynicism led it to create a new total takings categorical rule in 1992, in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which is tempered by the new
nuisance defense.83 Next, it places Lucas in a geophysical context, punctuated by Hurricanes Hugo and Katrina, and considers whether the
Court would decide Lucas differently today in light of new learning on
wetlands, hurricanes, and global warming.84
A. The Lucas Rule: Environmental Cynicism
[Riegulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial
or productive options for its use-typically, as here, by requiring land to
be left substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigatingserious public harm.
-Justice Antonin Scalia 85

Lucas represents one of the modern Supreme Court's most important applications of the regulatory takings doctrine. It also illustrates
what this Article calls environmental cynicism, the Court's inability to appreciate the value of undisturbed nature, and the Court's doubt that
the destruction of natural landscapes through development causes
measurable harm to neighboring communities. 86
The facts of Lucas are straightforward: The plaintiff/petitioner,
David Lucas, claimed that a South Carolina statute limiting development of his beachfront property on the Isle of Palms worked a regulatory taking for which the state owed compensation.8 7 For purposes of
the litigation, Lucas conceded that "discouraging new construction in
close proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great
83 See infra notes 85-120 and accompanying text.
81 See infra notes 121-151 and accompanying text.
8 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (emphasis added).
86See generally RichardJ. Lazarus, Restoring What"s EnvironmentalAbout EnvironmentalLaw
in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
failed to appreciate environmental law as a distinct area of law during the past three decades).
87 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007. The relevant statute was the South Carolina Beachfiont
Management Act. See id.; S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (1990) (amended 1990 & 2002).
As applied to the Lucas property, the statute "had the direct effect of barring petitioner
from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels." Lucas, 505 U.S. at

1007.
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public harm."88 However, Lucas convinced the lower court that the
challenged development restrictions had rendered his lots "valueless," a
finding the Supreme Court did not disturb. 89 Under traditional regulatory takings analysis-as outlined by the Supreme Court in 1978, in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York-the severe economic
impact to Lucas's property caused by South Carolina's regulation might
be offset by the critical governmental safety objective it served. 90 As the
Penn Central Court .suggested in 1978, "a 'taking' may more readily be
found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government ... than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."9 1 In holding for the petitioner, the Lucas Court declined to apply the traditional Penn Central
analysis. Instead, the Court created a new total takings categorical rule,
requiring governments to compensate landowners whenever regulation
"deprives land of all economically beneficial use.-92
The Isle of Palms was no ordinary community, rendering Lucas a
tale of supersized property rights. 93 In 2000, the area boasted a median household income eighty-one percent above the national average. 94 For his part, David Lucas was no ordinary landowner. In 1984,
Lucas headed up a development partnership that purchased the Wild
Dunes Beach and Racquet Club on the Isle of Palms for $25 million. 95
The partnership, Wild Dunes Associates, developed an exclusive 1500acre gated community that included 2500 residences and vacation
homes, two golf courses, and a large marina. 96 The project made Lucas a wealthy man, generating $100 million in sales by its second

88 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020.
8 Id. at 1007, 1009, 1018-19.
90 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying
several analytical factors of "particular significance," including "the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant," "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations," and "the character of the governmental action").
91 Id.

9- Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27, 1030.
93 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
94 Epodunk.com, Community Profiles, http://www.epodunk.com/cgi-bin/genInfo.
php?loclndex=13199 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (citing U.S. Census Bureau's 2000 Census,
which reported the local median household income in Isle of Palms, South Carolina as
$76,170 and the national median household income as $41,994).
95 Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIEs 221, 225 (G. Korngold & A. Morriss eds., 2004).
96 Id. The golf courses were ranked among the best in the world, and the marina is one
of the largest facilities in the southeastern United States. Id.
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year.97 In 1986, Lucas sold off his interest in the partnership. 98 Just
months later, he repurchased for himself two of the last undeveloped
beachfront lots for the sum of $975,000. 99 The fate of these two lotssevered from some 2500 other lots in the resort-would become the
limited focus of the Supreme Court litigation. 10 0
The Court's environmental cynicism led it to create a new categorical rule of governmental liability, rejecting the state's argument
that it had acted to mitigate serious public harm when it refused to approve Lucas's building plans. 101 For example, South Carolina presented
evidence that undeveloped lands provide valuable protection against
coastal storms and hurricanes, and that for "roughly half of the last 40
years, all or part of [the Lucas] property was part of the beach or
flooded twice daily ... "102 In addition, petitioner Lucas conceded the
validity of the statutory purpose, accepting legislative findings that an
undisturbed beach/dune zone "protects life and property by serving as
a storm barrier which dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in an economical and effective manner." 10 3 Despite such
evidence, the Court accepted the premise that oceanfront lands are
97Id. at 225-26.
98 Id. at 226.
99Id.
100See Been, supra note 95, at 226-28. Some have speculated that the bifurcation of the
sale and purchase transactions was a strategic decision to frame Lucas's position in more
sympathetic terms, should litigation erupt:
Although it is hard to understand why Lucas would have acquired the lots at
the high end of fair market value after he had cashed out of the partnership,
it's much easier to understand why he might want to describe his acquisition
that way if attention were ever focused on the transaction.... [I]f one were
trying to "position" the transaction for purposes of a subsequent takings lawsuit, it undoubtedly would be preferable to be seen as a "little guy" with just
two lots whose value was destroyed than to be cast as a wealthy developer of
more than 2500 homes, prevented from building on just two lots.
Id. at 227.
101Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018-19, 1025.
102 Id. at 1038 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).Justice Blackmun noted in dissent:
The area is notoriously unstable.... Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner's
property was under water. Between 1963 and 1973, the shoreline was 100 to
150 feet onto petitioner's property. In 1973, the first line of stable vegetation
was about halfway through the property. Between 1981 and 1983, the Isle of
Palms issued 12 emergency orders for sandbagging to protect property in the
Wild Dune[s] development [and a state agency determined] that habitable
structures were in imminent danger of collapse.
Id. at101038-39 (citations omitted).
3 Id. at 1021 n.10 (majority opinion).
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"valueless" in their natural state.10 4 The majority dismissed as meaningless legislative findings that coastal development must be regulated to
prevent harm to the community, concluding that "[because] such a
justification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to
a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff."105
As it announced its new rule, the Court also sowed the seeds of the
rule's destruction. 0 6 The Court predicted that the rule would apply in
only "extraordinary" or "relatively rare" circumstances.10 7 The concurring and dissenting Justices went farther; they doubted even that the
new rule applied to the case at bar, describing the lower court's finding
that the development regulation had rendered Lucas's lots valueless as
"curious"108 and "almost certainly erroneous." 109 Moreover, the Court
was quick to establish a defense to its new rule. 10 As Justice Stevens
noted wryly in dissent, "Like many bright line rules, the categorical rule
established in this case is only 'categorical' for a page or two in the U.S.
Reports. No sooner does the Court state that 'total regulatory takings
must be compensated,' than it quickly establishes an exception to that
rule."''
B. The Lucas Defense: New Nuisance as an Evolutionary,
Antecedent Inquiry
The Court tempered its new categorical rule with a governmental
defense of apparently limited scope. 12 Relying heavily upon judges,
104 Id. at 1007, 1009, 1018-19. The majority stated, "Whether Lucas's construction of
single-family residences on his parcels should be described as bringing 'harm' to South
Carolina's adjacent ecological resources thus depends principally upon whether the describer believes that the State's use interest in nurturing those resources is so important
that any competing adjacent use must yield." Id. at 1025. But see id. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (complaining that "the Court offers no basis for its assumption that the only
uses of property cognizable under the Constitution are developmental uses").
105Id. at 1026 n.12 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1010 (suggesting that main legislative goals were to promote tourism and to create natural habitat, rather than to prevent
development amounting to a public nuisance).
106 See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
107 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017, 1018. Ten years later, the Court clarified that the Lucas rule
applies to permanent regulatory takings only: "Lucas carved out a narrow exception to the
rules governing regulatory takings for the 'extraordinary circumstance' of a permanent
deprivation of all beneficial use." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 n.19 (2002).
108Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 1043-44 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
110Id. at 1027-32 (majority opinion).
"I Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citation omitted).
112 See infra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
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rather than legislators, to establish the proper balance between private rights and the public interest, the Court set forth the new nuisance
defense that is the focus of this Article:
[R]egulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of
land ... cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in ... the restrictions that back-

ground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such
an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners ... under the State's law of private nuisance,

or by the State under its complementary power to abate nui11 3
sances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
In traditional nuisance terms the Court explained that "the owner of a
lake-bed, for example, would not be entitled to compensation when he
is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that
would have the effect of flooding others' land." 114 In dissent, Justice
Blackmun chastised the Court for its elevation of longstanding judicial
judgments above legislative judgments, arguing that "[t] here is nothing
magical in the reasoning ofjudges long dead. They determined a harm
5
in the same way as state judges and legislators do today."11
The Court added two brief qualifications to its new defense that
would prove to be surprisingly beneficial to future government defendants.1 1 6 First, the Court explained that to resist compensation, the
state must demonstrate that "the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his tide to begin with."117 This reference to an "antecedent inquiry" would develop into an important affirmative defense
for government litigants. 118 Moreover, the Court provided a critical

reminder that nuisance law is fundamentally evolutionary, such that
"changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so." n 9 As Justice Kennedy explained in
113Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
114Id. at 1029.
115Id. at 1055 (Blackmunj., dissenting).
116 See Michael C. Blumin & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Back-

ground Principlesas CategoricalTakings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 321, 322 (2005).
117Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (emphasis added).
118 See infra notes 259-275 and accompanying text.
119Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
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concurrence, "The State should not be prevented from enacting new
regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions .... "120
C. The Lucas Bookends: From HurricaneHugo to HurricaneKatrina
By viewing Lucas through the lens of the region's recurrent experience with hurricanes, this Section brings the Court's environmental
cynicism into sharp focus. 1 2 1 From Hurricane Hugo (1989) to Hurri-

cane Katrina (2005) and beyond, the southeastern United States has
been pummeled repeatedly by coastal storms and hurricanes.12 2 The site
at issue in Lucas-the Isle of Palms, South Carolina-was particularly
vulnerable. As a barrier island, the area was "notoriously unstable."123 As
defined by one South Carolina state agency, barrier islands are "tidewater landforms that protect the mainland from the effects of sea storms,
[and] are characterized by an ever-changing beach, sand dunes, maritime forest and salt marsh."124
Prior to the 1992 decision in Lucas, South Carolina had a long history as a target of deadly storms, including significant activity in 1893,
1916, 1940, 1954 (Hurricane Hazel), 1959 (Hurricane Gracie), and
1989 (Hurricane Hugo). 125 Just three years prior to the Court's decision in Lucas, Hurricane Hugo had struck the very island in disputethe Isle of Palms-leading to thirty-five fatalities and over $7 billion in
damage. 26 Given the seriousness of these storms, the dissenting Justices
in Lucas would have upheld the application of South Carolina's protective legislation. 27 Drawing from "the hard lessons of experience,"'128 Justice Stevens found that the state's argument that the "beach/dune sys120 Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion expanded upon this evolutionary potential, asserting that a new appreciation of the "importance of wetlands and the vulnerability of coastal lands shapes our evolving understandings
of property rights." Id. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
121 See infra notes 122-151 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
123 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1038 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
124 S.C. Dep't of Parks, Recreation & Tourism, Discover Carolina: Life and Death of a
Barrier Island-Vocabulary List, http://www.discovercarolina.com/html/s05naturel04aO1e.
html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
125 S.C. STATE CLIMATOLOGY OFFICE, supTa note 3.
26

1

Id.

127

See infra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
Respondent's Brief on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of

128

South Carolina at *31, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992) (No. 91453), 1992 WL 672613 (arguing that legislative policies regulating coastal development
.are not based upon abstract conclusions that building on barrier islands like the Isle of
Palms is dangerous to life and property and significantly damaging to the fragile
beach/dune system").
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tem [acts] as a buffer from high tides, storm surge, [and] hurricanes"
had "much science on its side." 129 Likewise, dissenting Justice Blackmun
argued that "uncontrolled beachfront development can cause serious
damage to life and property" by "destroy[ing] the natural sand dune
barriers that provide storm breaks." 3 0 He worried that "beachfront
buildings are not only themselves destroyed [by hurricanes], but they
31
are often driven, like battering rams, into adjacent inland homes."'
After Lucas, the storm pattern continued, both in South Carolina
3 2 Less
and in the broader southeastern region of the United States.
than one month after the Court decided Lucas, Hurricane Andrew
made landfall along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Florida, leading to
forty deaths and $30 billion in property damage. 3 3 Subsequent years
witnessed additional deadly storms. 3 4 In 2004, nine tropical storms
caused over $42 billion in damage, more than one hundred deaths
along the Atlantic coast of the United States, and some three thousand
deaths in Haiti.13 5 The 2005 storm season would be even more severe
for the United States, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the
Gulf Coast on August 29th and September 24th, respectively.136 Hurricane Katrina covered approximately eighty percent of New Orleans
with six to twenty feet of water.137 The storm resulted in the deaths of
1400 people 3 8 and caused $80 billion in damage. 39 Hurricane Rita,
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 (StevensJ, dissenting).
130 Id. at 1037 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (drawing lessons from the deaths and
property damage caused by Hurricane Hugo in 1989).
i1' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 See infra notes 133-141 and accompanying text.
133 After the Storm: Hurricane Andrew Ten Years Later, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 2002,
http://www.sptimes/2002/webspecials02/andrew (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (describing
Hurricane Andrew's path across south Florida and Louisiana).
134 See infra notes 135-141 and accompanying text.
135 NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CLIMATE OF 2004: ATLANTIC
129

SEASON (2004), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2004/hurricanes04.htm [hereinafter CLIMATE OF 2004].
HURRICANE
13

6 NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CLIMATE OF 2005: ATLANTIC

(2006), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/hurricanes05.html [hereinafter CLIMATE OF 2005].
HURRICANE SEASON

137 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND

SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LEsSONS LEARNED

2 (2006), availableat http://pur.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS67263.

138 LA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HOSPITALS, HURRICANE KATRINA,

DECEASED REPORTS,

http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=5248
(2006) (counting
1464 deaths in Louisiana from Hurricane Katrina).
159 Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. (NOAA), Noteworthy Records of the 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season, NOAA NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/

stories2005/s2540b.htm (placing Hurricane Katrina damage at a minimum of $80 billion).
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the fourth "strongest" hurricane ever recorded, 140 caused some $10 bil141
lion in damage.
Although analysis is ongoing, several lessons have emerged from
these disasters. 142 First, wetlands are valuable resources that moderate
the impacts of coastal storms and hurricanes. 43 The General Accounting Office likens wetlands to "speed bump[s], slowing down storms almost as dry land does." 144 Although not free from dispute, there is evidence that every 2.7 linear miles of coastal wetlands can reduce the
height of storm surges by one foot. 145 Second, "natural" disasters such

as hurricanes can be exacerbated by human activity. 46 For example,
Louisiana and other Gulf States were rendered increasingly vulnerable
to hurricanes as coastal wetlands were destroyed. 147 The Congressional
Research Service reports that "[it is now believed that more than 1.2
million acres [of Gulf Coast] wetlands, an area approximately the size
14
of Delaware, has been converted to open water since the 1930s." 8
In light of these "changed circumstances" and this "new knowledge," would the U.S. Supreme Court decide Lucas differently today?149
140NOAA, supra note 139 (listing Hurricanes Wilma, Rita, and Katrina as "three of the
six strongest hurricanes on record").
141 CLIMATE OF 2005, supra note 136 (reporting over $10 billion in total losses from
Hurricane Rita).
142 See infra notes 143-148 and accompanying text. For a compilation of information
about Louisiana's coastal wetlands derived from experts in the field and sponsored by the
"America's Wetland" campaign, see America's Wetland: Resource Center, http://www.
americaswetlandresources.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
13 See infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
144 HurricaneKatrina:Providing Oversight of the Nation's Preparedness,Response, and Recovery Activities: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 109th Cong. 7
(2005) (statement of Norman, J. Rabkin), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d051053t.pdf (noting that wetlands, "once regarded as unimportant areas to be filled or
drained ...are now recognized for [a] variety of important functions.., including providing flood control by slowing down and absorbing excess water during storms... and protecting coastal and upland areas from erosion").
1t Bob Sullivan, Wetlands Erosion Raises HurricaneRisks, MSNBC.coM, Aug. 29, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9118570 (quoting Sidney Coffee, executive assistant to
the Governor of Louisiana for coastal activities).
146See infra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
147 Louisiana Sea Grant, Louisiana Hurricane Resources: Barrier Islands & Wetlands,
Oct. 10, 2005, available at http://www.laseagrant.org/hurricane/archive/wetlands.hun
(quoting Rex Caffey, Louisiana Sea Grant College Program, Louisiana State University
AgCenter for the proposition that "At a minimum, we can say that the net loss of 1.2 million acres of coastal wetlands has definitely increased the vulnerability and exposure of
Louisiana's critical coastal infrastructure").
148 JEFFREY ZINN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HURRICANES KATRINA AND RrrA AND THE
COASTAL LOUISIANA ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 2 (2005); see also infra notes 326-327 and

accompanying text.
149See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
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Some evidence suggests a negative response, indicating that the Court
remains skeptical that wetlands function as natural flood control systems, at least in the context of noncoastal, interior wetlands. In its 2006
decision in Rapanos v. United States, for example, the Court was disappointingly simplistic-even hostile-in its unwillingness to recognize
the national interest in preserving healthy wetland ecosystems.150 Despite the Supreme Court's. continued environmental cynicism, state
courts and the lower federal courts appear more willing to incorporate
new learning into their background principles of property law and nui1 51
sance.
M.

PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM: LucAs IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for youask what you can do for your country.

-PresidentJohn

F. Kennedy

52

[We must be clear about ourpurposes. The aim here is efficiency, not austerity... Conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a
sufficient basis all by itselffor a sound, comprehensive energy policy.

-Vice President Dick Cheney'5 3
Society has long struggled to achieve a balance between individual
autonomy and the welfare of the community. From the perspective of
the individual, this represents a search for balance between rights and
responsibilities, and between personal freedom and sacrifice for the
commonwealth. From the perspective of political theory, this repre150 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2215 (2006). Although wetland science has become a highly complex area of study, the Court relied upon a dictionary definition of wetlands. See id. at 2225.
151See infra notes 244-311 and accompanying text. In a different environmental context, the Supreme Court has changed course in light of new learning about the danger of
certain methods of coal extraction. Compare Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-16
(1922) (holding Kohler Act worked a regulatory taking, despite asserted public safety purpose of preventing mine-induced subsidence), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481-93 (1987) (holding state mining regulation does not work
a regulatory taking, despite its striking similarity to the Kohler Act), and M&J Coal Co. v.
United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that subsidence control plan
was not a taking under Lucas nuisance defense). See generally Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., A
Homeowner's Guide to Mine Subsidence, http://www'dep.state.pa.us/MSIHomeowners/
(last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
152 PresidentJohn F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).
153 Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Associated
Press, Toronto, Canada (Apr. 30, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/print/vp20010430.html.
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sents a tension between the visions of government as laissez-faire-protector-of-vested-rights, and government as public-interest-regulator. As
discussed in Part I, property advocates have undertaken a highly organized campaign over the past few decades to win public support for
stronger individual rights, fewer individual responsibilities, and weaker
154
governmental regulation.
This Part places the autonomy/community, rights/responsibilities
tension into historical context, noting cycles during which one or the
other of the competing philosophies has claimed a position of ascendancy.15 5 As a very broad generalization, the discussion identifies the
following dominant paradigms of the twentieth century- individualism
(1900-1933) ;156 communitarianism (1933-1981) ;157 and individualism

(1981-2000).158 The discussion reviews the work of two influential
scholars of the twentieth century--Charles Reich and Richard Epsteinwhose ideas were introduced during the latter two periods, respectively. 15 9 Both Reich and Epstein used the language of individual "rights"
in framing impassioned pleas for social reform and feared the power of
the majority to impose its will upon lone individuals. 160 But beyond the
common call for increased rights, their philosophies diverged.' 61 This
Part concludes by observing signs of a return to the spirit of community
responsibility, coinciding roughly with the end of both the twentieth
1 62
century and the Rehnquist Court.
A. The IndustrialRevolution: PromotingIndividual Rights (1900-1933)
The rise of the modern industrialized world has dramatically
changed the quality of life, in both positive and negative ways. The first
wave of the industrial revolution occurred in Great Britain at the end of
the 18th century, and by the end of the 19th century, a "second" indus-

154 See supra notes 28-82 and accompanying text.
155 See infra notes 163-243 and accompanying text.
156 See infra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
157See infra notes 168-213 and accompanying text.
158 See infra notes 214-224 and accompanying text.
159See infra notes 183-213, 217-224 and accompanying text.
160 See infra notes 183-213, 217-224 and accompanying text.
161See infra notes 183-213, 217-224 and accompanying text.
162 See infra notes 225-243 and accompanying text. William H. Rehnquist was Chief
Justice from September 26, 1986 to September 3, 2005. Supreme Court of the United
States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, hitp://www.supremecourtus.
gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Members of the Supreme
Court].
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trial revolution was occurring in the United States. 163 Overall, America's
industrialization spawned a rational, but perhaps over-exuberant embrace of economic and industrial growth, often at the expense of other
social values. "Property rights" were of paramount value during this
time, even if the rights holder was a vast industry or corporation, rather
than an identifiable human being. 64 Popular culture reinforced this
preference for autonomy and rights over community and responsibility.
For example, the "flapper" society of the 1920s drew support from "the
rebellious spirit of jazz" that functioned as an "alternative culture-a
sort of anti-law."165

Many judges of the early twentieth century embraced the new economic and social order with unquestioning faith in the virtue of "progress," zealously protecting individual property and autonomy through
substantive due process analysis. As illustrated by the now-discredited
1905 decision in Lochner v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court then
looked with distrust upon public interest legislation designed to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of laborers by limiting the rights of indus166
trial employers.
The case of the developing railroads presents another example of
judicial solicitude for the maintenance of industry relatively unfettered
by governmental regulation. In articulating the well-known "stop, look,
and listen" rule for railroad crossings, Justice Holmes's 1927 observation serves as a metaphor for the march of progress: "When a man goes
upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a place where he will be

163See Glenn Porter, IndustrialRevolution, in MICROSor ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA (2007), http://Encarta.msn.com/text..761577952_0/IndustrialRevolution.html.

164 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (reversing conviction of
bakery owner for violating labor safety law setting maximum hours for New York bakers),
overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
165 See Amy Leigh Wilson, Commentary, A Unifying Anthem or Path to Degradation?:The
Jazz Influence in American Property Law, 55 ALA. L. REv. 425, 430 (2004) (asserting that
"white youths used Uazz] to champion social rebellion and critique stringent adult standards" and that "[d)aring white women, known as 'flappers,' embraced the short bob hairstyle, danced freely, drove cars, and even openly frequented saloons").
166 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. The Court indicated little interest in upholding laws "pertaining to the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker," particularly
where such laws might hinder economic productivity. Id. (concluding that "[clean] and
wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day
or only sixty hours a week"). But see id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (claiming that bakery work was then notoriously difficult, involving "a great deal of physical exertion in an
overheated workshop," the "constant inhaling of flour dust," and a reduced life span).
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killed if a train comes upon him before he is clear of the track. He
167
knows that he must stop for the train, not the train stop for him."

B. The New Deal and the Great Society: PromotingCommunity Welfare
(1933-1981)
The Government cannot get along without you [community leaders]. The
Federal, State, local Governments can't. The whole period we are going
through will come back in the end to individual citizens, to individual responsibility, to private organization,through the years to come.

-President Franklin D. Roosevelt'"
[The Great Society] is a place where the city of man serves not only the
needs of the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty
and the hungerfor community.
-President

Lyndon B.Johnson 169

1. Social Legislation to Promote Community Welfare
As industrialization became more widespread, so also did its
abuses. As a reaction to the excesses of the first wave of industrialization, the common law of negligence and nuisance evolved as remedies for torts, both direct and indirect. 70 By the end of the nineteenth
century, the great leaders of industry-heading powerful railroad,
steel, oil, and tobacco corporations-were simultaneously revered as
"captains of industry" and scorned as "robber barons."1 7' As an anti167 Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927) (reversing judgment
for estate of deceased automobile driver and establishing the rule that travelers must "stop,
look, and listen" before crossing the tracks).
168 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, An Extemporaneous Address Before the 1933
Conference on Mobilization for Human Needs (Sept. 8, 1933), available at http://newdeal.
ferLorg/speeches/ 1933h.htm.
169 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan (May 22,
1964), available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/
640522.asp.
170 PROSSER. AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS 161, 617 (W. Page Keeton ed., West

Publ'g Co. 5th ed. 1984) (1941). The authors observe that the rise of negligence during the
first half of the nineteenth century in England "coincided in a marked degree with the Industrial Revolution; and it very probably was stimulated by the rapid increase in the number
of accidents caused by industrial machinery, and in particular by the invention of railways."
Id. at 161. Nuisance "became fixed in the law as early as the thirteenth century" but, according to the authors, came into sharper focus with the publication of the First Restatement of
Torts in 1939. Id. at 617; seeRESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS §§ 822-840 (1939).
171 SeeJudith L. Maute, Response: The Values of Legal Archaeology, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 223,
241-42 (describing "the gilded era of robber barons who became fabulously wealthy in
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dote to the latter, beginning with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,
Congress began to pass legislation to protect the public from anti72
competitive behavior.
After the stock market crash of 1929, Congress turned its legislative attention to the restoration of the nation's economic and social
wellbeing. During the so-called New Deal era of the 1930s and the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Congress passed a host of new
7
public interest legislation, including the Social Security Act of 19351 3
74
and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.1
President Roosevelt's social legislation continued during the 1960s,
as President Lyndon B. Johnson's "Great Society" program sought to
bring an end to poverty and racial injustice. 75 Johnson's initiative led
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,176 the Voting Rights Act of
1965,177 and the creation of Medicare, 178 Medicaid, 179 Head Start, I'0 the

railroads, industrial trusts, and industrial expansion"); Henry Morrison Flagler Museum,
America's Gilded Age, http://flaglermuseum.us/html/gildedage.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2007) (describing the Gilded Age as a time when "[t]he captains of industry and com-

merce... became wealthy beyond what most can imagine today").
172 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
1-7 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)); see also Debra A. Valentine, Assistant Dir. Int'l Antitrust
Div, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Goals of Competition Law, Prepared Remarks for the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Conference on Trade and Competition Policy (May
13-14, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvspeech.shtm (describing
the Sherman Act as a congressional response to a "popular outcry" against the robber

§§

barons of the Gilded Age).
173 Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 301-1397j (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)). See generally Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security
History, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
174 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 201-219 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007)). At first, during the so-called "Lochner era," the
courts struck down many of these public interest statutes under substantive due process
review designed to protect economic and property rights. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 6465.
175 See The American Presidency: Lyndon Baines Johnson, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA,
http://ap.grolier.com/article?assetid=0224340-00 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (describing
President Johnson's efforts to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and his call for an "un-

conditional war on poverty"); see also The White House, Biography of Lyndon B. Johnson,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/lj36.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
176Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)).
177Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971-1974e (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)).
178 Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (1965)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13 95-1395ggg (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)).
179Grants for States for Medical Assistance Programs, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343
(1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396v (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)).

HeinOnline -- 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1180 2007

2007]

The New Nuisance

Job Corps, 18' and the Community Action Program. 182 Overall, the period from roughly 1933 to 1981 witnessed the formation of the modern
welfare state. During this time, there was an increasing appreciation for
the role of the federal government as an agent to promote and protect
the public interest.
2. The New Property
As we move toward a welfare state, largess will be an ever more important
form of wealth. And largess is a vital link in the relationship between the
government and private sides of society. It is necessary, then, that largess
begin to do the work of property.
-Charles

Reich I 8

During the contagious optimism and idealism of the Great Society
era, Charles Reich wrote The New Property.' 4 From his 1964 vantage
point, Reich attempted to describe the emerging "new society." 18 He
focused particularly upon government largess-forms of wealth dispensed by the government to its citizens, including income, benefits,
jobs, occupational licenses, franchises, contracts, subsidies, and services. 18 6 Reich observed that these new government benefits were
"steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth-forms which
are held as private property."187 But Reich worried that these new benefits failed to incorporate sufficient safeguards for their recipients. Instead, he feared, the government had broad discretion to withdraw
these intangible rights at any time.' 88 Reich accepted that the new "pub180Head Start Programs, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 499 (1981) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
181Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (establishing,
inter alia, the Job Corps) (repealed 1981).
8
1 2 Financial Assistance to Community Action Programs and Related Activities, Pub. L.
No. 88-452, 81 Stat. 696 (1967) (repealed 1981).
'ss Reich, supra note 14, at 778; see also Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View ofDue Process, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 731, 733 (1990) [hereinafter Reich, An Ecological View] (asserting that "in a centrally managed economy, such as we have today, the due
process clause gives every person in America a constitutional right to minimum subsistence and housing, to child care, education, employment, health insurance, retirement,
and to a clean and healthy natural environment").
184 See generally Reich, supra note 14.
185Id. at 733.
186 Id. at 734-37.
187Id. at 733.
18 Id. at 768. Reich noted that "wealth that flows from the government is held by its
recipients conditionally, subject to confiscation in the interest of the paramount state," a
result that "resembles the philosophy of feudal tenure." Id. at 768-69.
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lic interest state" was part of a "great and necessary movement for reform." 189 He saw the "revised social contract" as a government promise

190
to protect its citizens from "the extremes of economic dislocation."
And he acknowledged that there was no turning back. 191 Overall, however, Reich asserted that the "public interest" had been grossly misinterpreted, thereby distorting the high purposes of the reforms of the
192
New Deal and the Great Society.
To compensate for the insecurity of benefits provided by the
emerging welfare state, Reich proposed a solution cloaked in the language of rights and property. He argued not for the abolition of government welfare programs, but instead that individual entitlements
under such programs should receive the protections enjoyed by private
property. 93 In sum, he maintained that the conception of government
benefits should move from largess to right. Reich more fully developed
his views in three subsequent articles: Beyond the New Property:An Ecological View of Due Process (1990);194 The Liberty Impact of the New Property
(1990) ;195 and Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middie Americans and the Poor (1996).196
Reich's call for increased property rights may initially appear to
be in alignment with the interests of the modern-day property rights
movement. From this perspective, The New Property might be a precursor to the writings of Richard Epstein and other property rights advo-

189Reich, supra note 14, at 771.

190Charles A. Reich, Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middle Americans and the Poor,71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.817, 817 (1996).
191Reich, supra note 14, at 778. Reich wrote, T'here can be no retreat from the public
interest state. It is the inevitable outgrowth of an interdependent world. An effort to return to an earlier economic order would merely transfer power to giant private governments which would rule not in the public interest, but in their own interest." Id.
192Id. at 777.
193Id. at 771-87. In 1996, Reich summarized the thesis of The New Property this way:
[As a result of reform efforts], increased constitutional powers were assumed
by the government in return for societal responsibility to the individuals who
gave up their economic independence in recognition of the greater efficiency
of large organizations. The New Property argued that, if the new social contract
was to be respected, welfare state protections and benefits for the middle class
and the poor must be treated as entitlements--a substitute for old forms of
property.
Reich, supra note 190, at 817.
194See generally Reich, An Ecological View, supra note 183.
195See generally Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Pmperty, 31 WM. & MARY
L. REv.295 (1990).
19 See generally Reich, supra note 190.
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cates. 197 At least three facets of Reich's writing, however, belie this preliminary impression.1 98 First, Reich tempered his concern for private
property with a firm underpinning of instrumentalism. 199 He wasfirst and foremost-a champion of society's weakest and most vulnerable members, deploring the inequalities that he observed throughout his life.200 Over twenty-five years after the publication of The New
Property, Reich asserted passionately:
It is one thing to accept inequality as part of our system,
where some enjoy luxury while other lives are comparatively
spartan. But what we see today is not the kind of inequality
that provides incentive to healthy ambition; it is misery that
fills the rest of us with fear and horror. This is too great a punishment for fecklessness or failure; it falls below the line of
what any society can morally tolerate.20 1
A persistent critic of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a
few, 202 Reich claimed, "'Ownership' has allowed corporations to be-

come empires, sometimes under the control of a single individual
....
"203 Far from favoring the autonomous rights advanced by property advocates, Reich concluded that as a result of economic disparity,
20 4
"Property law has been turned upside down."

197See supra notes 28-82
rights movement); infra notes
198See infra notes 199-213
199See infra notes 200-204

and accompanying text (discussing the modern property
217-224 and accompanying text (discussing Epstein).
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.

2ooSee, e.g., Reich, An EcologicalView, supra note 183, at 737 ("Not for a minute should
we concede that existence in a cardboard box on a city sidewalk is 'life' in the constitutional sense.").
201Id. at 743.

202Reich, supra note 190, at 823 (observing, "[a]s a result of the denial of true ownership to individuals, corporations, along with a small group of very rich individuals, have
become the principal owners of the nation's wealth").
20
3 Id. at 819.
204Id. In The New Property, Reich observed that previous reforms:
took away some of the power of the corporations and transferred it to government. In this transfer there was much good, for power was made responsive to the majority rather than to the arbitrary and selfish few. But the reform did not restore the individual to his domain. Whait the corporation had
taken from him, the reform simply handed on to government.... Today it is
the combined power of government and the corporations that presses against
the individual.
Reich, supra note 14, at 773. Reich was quick to add that his view was not intended as "antiinstitutional," but was simply a call to recognize that "the organizational revolution of the
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As a second line of departure from modern property rights advocates, Reich's writings are communitarian rather than individualistic
in tone, emphasizing responsibility as well as rights. 205 He identified as
fundamental the question of "how much responsibility ...

the com-

munity [should] take for the protection of the individual."20 6 In arguing for a broad duty, Reich exclaimed that "there is something grotesquely wrong with a society that denies individual life support while
spending billions of dollars of public money on anything else. That
even one person should be without shelter while the community's
wealth is spent elsewhere is an abomination." 20 7 In emphasizing responsibility as well as rights, he reasoned that society tolerates continued suffering in its midst because "we do not feel responsible ourselves, and we do not feel that society is responsible.... It is the
20 8
premise of non-responsibility that allows us to look the other way."

Finally, in sharp relief from the distaste for environmental regulation expressed by the modern property rights* movement, Reich found
a critical relationship between environmental and social wellbeing, believing that "the idea of the individual's property is ecological.... Human life developed in organic communities... [in which] the individual is not threatened by starvation or lack of shelter unless the entire
community is similarly threatened. ... "209 Reich explained:
The crisis of the natural environment and the crisis of the unprotected individual are similar.... The lakes, trees, and wildlife dying from acid rain and the human beings dying on our
city streets are alike in that they are victims of an economic
210
system out of control in that it denies and displaces its costs.

The impact of The New Property has been profound, although
Reich himself was pessimistic that his larger message had been received. 211 Writing thirty years after publication of The New Property,
present time has its costs in individual liberty-and security that now demand protection."
Reich, supra note 195, at 305.
205 See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
206 Reich, An Ecological View, supra note 183, at 731; see also id. at 733 (suggesting the
community should make individual security an absolute, constitutional right 'which must
be honored ahead of the other goals of society").
207 Id. at 739.
208 Id. at 744 (suggesting that corrective action, and not blame, is necessary when unacceptable conditions 'were created by many different public and private bodies, if not by
all of us").
20 Id. at 737.
210

Id. at 734.
infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.

211 See
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Reich worried, "The concept of 'new property' for the great mass of
working Americans has been rejected, and with it the promise of secure economic citizenship." 212 In contrast to Reich's pessimism, supporters and critics alike have cited Reich's writings hundreds of times,
bearing testimony to the enduring legacy of his work, and to its influ2 13
ence upon the way scholars and jurists think about property.
C. From New Property to New Nuisance: The Return of IndividualRights
(1981-2000)
[Gireed,for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed
clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit.
Greed, in all of itsforms: greed for life, for money, for love, [for] knowledge
has marked the upward surge of mankind ....
214
-Gordon Gekko, Wall Street

By the 1980s, society had cast off the previous generation's worrisome idealism, replacing it with the pragmatic pursuit of wealth and
security. Like the powerful industrialists a century earlier, corporate
executives of the period were tempted by opportunities to promote
their individual well-being at the expense of the community welfare, a
temptation that the popular culture satirized in films such as Wall
Street.215 During this era, Ronald Reagan served as president 216 and
2 17
Richard Epstein advanced his property rights philosophy
Epstein's writings mark an historical shift from the philosophy of
communitarianism to that of individualism. His work-which resonated with the Reagan era's antipathy toward governmental regula212 Reich, supra note 190, at 819. Reich bemoaned, "Thirty years later, it is clear that
the law has failed to protect the economic citizenship of individuals. After a few important
but tentative steps, including Goldbergv. Kelly, the law has turned against the whole concept
of individual economic rights." Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970)
(requiring pretermination evidentiary hearing prior to the discontinuance of public assistance payments to welfare recipients, and citing with approval to the writings of Reich)).
213 See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also HOWARD, supra note 28, at 124-25
(asserting that rights "became a fad," critically noting that "Reich got his wish" as expressed in The New Prperty).
214WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987). In the film Wall Street, Gordon Gekko,
a ruthless corporate raider played by Michael Douglas, advises a young Wall Street stockbroker how to achieve success in the corporate world of the 1980s. See id.
215See id.
216See The White House, Biography of Ronald Reagan, http://www.whitehouse.gov/his-

tory/presidents/rr40.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Biography of Reagan].
217 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 30. Epstein's most prominent work, Takings: Private
Property and the Powerof EminentDomain, was published in 1985. See generally id.
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tion 2 1 8-formed the intellectual blueprint for the modern property
rights movement.2 19 Whereas Reich saw a societal problem of nonresponsibility and looked for ways to employ the "community's wealth"
in the public interest, Epstein advanced a notion of property rights
under which individuals should not be forced to bear community
burdens. 220 Epstein saw the state "not [as] the source of individual
rights or of social community" but as a vehicle that acts "solely in response to the demands to preserve order."221
Epstein's views influenced the Supreme Court, most notably in
1992, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 222 where the Court limited the permissible scope of uncompensated government regulation
in certain cases to a seemingly narrow "new nuisance" defense.2 23 In
contrast to Reich's concern for the rights of society's weakest members,
the property reforms that Epstein championed (and echoed in Lucas)
would cast a wider net, strengthening the rights of rich and poor
224
alike.
D. From Lucas to Lingle: The Return of Community Safeguards?
After Lucas, the U.S. Supreme Court decided six additional regulatory takings cases22 5 before the era of the Rehnquist Court came to a

218

See generally Biography of Reagan, supra note 216 (stating that Ronald Reagan, Presi-

dent from 1981-89, sought to reduce reliance upon government).
219 See supranotes 30-32 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text (discussing Reich's philosophy); see
also EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 265. Epstein contends that:
[z]oning stands in stark contrast to a system of private property, which allows
a single owner (within the confines of the nuisance limitation) to decide how
to use his plot of land. Where property rights are enforced, owners can make
choices on efficient land use without having to overcome the conundrums of
collective choice.

Id.
22
222
223

See EPSTExN, supra note 30, at 333-34.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-32 (1992); see supra notes 85-

120 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing application of Epsteinian philosophy to David Lucas, a wealthy land developer).
25 See generally San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005);
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
(2001); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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close in 2005.226 Arguably, the cases indicate a renewed concern for

the public interest served by land use and other environmental regulations, thereby beginning to restore the balance between individual
227
rights and community welfare.
Two of the six post-Lucas cases are particularly instructive. In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, six
members of the Court refused to hold that a total ban on development for thirty-two months-during which the community finalized
its comprehensive land use plan-required compensation as a total
taking under Lucas.228 Instead, the Court insisted that the delay suffered by the landowners was but one factor to be measured against
the competing public interest:
Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves
the straightforward application of per se rules. Our regulatory
takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage
and is characterized by essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,
designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all the
relevant circumstances. 229
This renewed focus upon the public interest was reinforced just
three years later, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.,

Inc.23 0 In that case, a

unanimous Supreme Court reversed course, rejecting its prior statement that government regulators bear the burden of demonstrating
that certain land use regulations "substantially advance legitimate
state interests."23 1 Explicitly uncoupling the analytical framework of

226 See Members of the Supreme Court, supra note 162. Following the death of Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, John G. Roberts, Jr. was appointed the seventeenth Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court on September 29, 2005. Id. On January 31, 2006, Samuel A.

Alito, Jr. assumed the associate justice position vacated by the retiring Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. Id.
227 See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice:Justice Scalia and the Faltering
of the PropertyRights Movement Within the Supreme Court,57 HASTINGS LJ. 759 (2006).
228 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
229 Id. at 322 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lazarus, supra
note 227, at 819 (concluding that after Tahoe-Sierra, Lucas's "precedential reach became
almost a nullity").
230 544 U.S. at 540-45.
231 See id.; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (imposing re-

quirement in context of development exaction), abrogated by Lingle 544 U.S. at 540-45.
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regulatory takings from that of substantive due process, 23 2 the Court

relieved the government of a heightened burden of proof, restoring a
measure of balance to the analysis developed in 1978, in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City of New York. 233 The Court acknowledged that
the "substantially advances" detour had been an analytical mistake,
234
and conceded that it must "eat crow" to correct its error.
After an initial period of flux, a similar pattern of regulatory tolerance emerged from the post-Lucas decisions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.235 In the immediate aftermath of Lucas, the Federal Circuit interpreted Lucas as signaling a "sea change"
favorable to the property rights of landowners. 236 Under this view, the
government's defense in all regulatory takings cases-extending beyond the narrow universe of Lucas total-takings cases-was restricted
to background principles of nuisance and property law.2 37 As a result,

Penn Centrars wide-ranging balancing of regulatory benefits and burdens was replaced with a cramped sphere of acceptable government
action. 238 For example, in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that the prohibition
of construction in a wetland constituted a regulatory taking.2 39 The

court explained:
The effect, then, of Lucas was to dramatically change the third
criterion [of the Penn Central analysis], from one in which
courts ...were called upon to ...balanc [e] ...private prop-

erty rights against state regulatory policy, to one in which state
property law, incorporating common law nuisance doctrine,
controls. This sea change removed from regulatory takings

232 Lingk 544 U.S. at 540 (explaining that the "'substantially advances' [test] ...prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings test, and ...it has no
proper place in our takings jurisprudence").
233 See id. at 540-45.
234 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (No. 04-163) (remarks of

Justice Scalia).
235 See infra notes 236-243 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491
(2000) (providing U.S. Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving
over $10,000, and sharing concurrent jurisdiction with the federal district courts for regulatory takings claims not exceeding $10,000).
236 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v.United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
237 See id.
238
See id.
239 Id. at 1173, 1183.

HeinOnline -- 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1188 2007

20071

1189

The New Nuisance

the vagaries of the balancing process.... It substituted instead
a referent familiar to property lawyers everywhere .... 240
The Federal Circuit's aggressive interpretation of property rights
under Lucas endured for a decade. 241 In 2004, however, the Circuit
announced its "return to the pre-Lucas evaluation of the 'character of
the Government actions' factor [of Penn Central]." 242 Thereafter, the
court noted, it would adopt a "gestalt approach," evaluating both the
purpose and desired effect of governmental regulation. 243 As a result,
the Federal Circuit removed its judicial thumb from the "individual
rights" side of the individual-community balancing scale.
IV.

WHAT'S NEW ABOUT NUISANCE? THE AFTERMATH OF LUCAS

[Tihe Lucas legacy represents one of the starkest recent examples of the law
of unintended consequences.

-Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie 2 "

To the extent... that takings law has perceptibly shifted since the Court's
1978 Penn Central ruling, it has arguably become more and not less dif-

ficult for regulatory takings plaintiffs to prevail.... What Scalia [through
Lucas] hoped to serve as a per se takings rule proves, in its practicaloperation, to work more often as a per se no takings rule.
-RichardJ.

Lazarus 24 5

This Part will trace the post-Lucas development of the law of new
nuisance.246 In broad strokes, the discussion will consider the evolution
of the "antecedent inquiry,"247 as well as the "changed circumstances
or new knowledge" contemplated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992,

240 Id. at 1179; see also Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (characterizing the Loveladies analysis as a Penn Centraltest with a "Lucas

gloss").
241 See Bass, 381 F.3d at 1369 (describing the Circuit's position from Loveladies, decided
in 1994, to PalmBeach Isles Associates, decided in 2000).
242 Id. at 1370.
243 Id.; see also Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344; 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(noting that courts should "consider the purpose and importance of the public interest

underlying a regulatory imposition").
244 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 116, at 322.
245 Lazarus, supra note 227, at 823-24.
246 See infra notes 247-311 and accompanying text.
247 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
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in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.248 This analysis will set the
stage for Part V's application of new nuisance doctrine to three specific environmental problems: wedand development, sprawling land
2 49
use patterns, and global warming.
The first draft of this Part produced a workmanlike, methodical
cataloguing of the extent to which new scientific learning has been incorporated into the Lucas defense. As reported by Michael Blumm and
Lucus Ritchie, Lucas left a legacy surprisingly favorable to governmental
defendants in the form of a new defense that proved to be categorical
in nature. 250 Beyond confirming that discovery, my subsequent work on
the manuscript uncovered a second unexpected development-Lucas
may have contributed to a spillover effect, reinvigorating the use of nuisance in its traditional offensive tort posture, outside the context of a
defense to regulatory takings claims.251 That is, as new ecological and
other learning began to connect the dots between cause and effect,
252
more aggressive nuisance claims became viable.
Third, yet another analytical surprise took shape, this time in the
factual context of climate change.253 As California enacted state legislation on global warming, property rights advocates were largely silent. 254 The regulatory takings challenges that I had anticipated did

not materialize. 255 Instead, many in the regulated community acquiesced, with some even calling for broad federal regulation. 256 Can this
reaction be attributed, at least in part, to Lucas? Part IV considers this
possibility.257 In addition, it describes in more detail the progression

of new nuisance law from Lucas defense, to common law offense, and
258
beyond to catalyst for legislative action.

248

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031; see also supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.

249 See
250

infra notes 312-536 and accompanying text.
See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 116, at 332; infra notes 266-268 and accompanying

text.
251 See

infra notes 388-393, 438-443, 473-502 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 285-311 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 460-461 and accompanying text.
254 See infra notes 460-461 and accompanying text.
255 See infra notes 460-461 and accompanying text. The acceptance, of course, was not
252

uniform, as witnessed by legal challenges based upon nontakings theories such as preemption. See infra notes 464-466 and accompanying text.
256 See infra notes 523-527 and accompanying text.
297 See infra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
258 See infra notes 259-283 and accompanying text.
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A. The New Posture:From Defense, to Offense, to Legislative Catalyst
1. New Nuisance as Defense
Lucas made clear that the new nuisance rule functiohs as an affirmative defense to governmental liability in cases where regulation
deprives property of all economically beneficial use.2 59 Procedurally,

the Court explained, the defense should be considered as part of an
"antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate," during which
the government bears the burden of "show[ing] that the proscribed
2 60
use interests were not part of [the landowner's] title to begin with."
In bearing its burden, the government may go beyond traditional
public and private nuisance, relying also upon "background principles
of the State's law of property."2 61 Concurring Justice Kennedy emphasized that in his view the defense should be construed broadly, arguing that "the common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the
exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society."262 Following this view, lower courts have recognized a wide variety
263
of takings defenses embedded in state nuisance and property law,
26 4
both common law and statutory.
As the lower courts have worked through the ramifications of the
265
Lucas defense, at least two important developments have followed.
First, as Blumm and Ritchie have noted, in some cases Lucas's landowner-friendly categorical rule of liability has given way to a regulatorfriendly categorical defense:

[R]ather than heralding in a new era of landowner compensation or government deregulation, Lucas instead spawned a
surprising rise of categorical defenses to takings claims in
259 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-30.
260Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
261Id. at 1029.
262Id. at 1035 (KennedyJ., concurring).
263 See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 116, at 367 (concluding that "over the past twelve
years, nearly a dozen distinct categories of Lucas-inspired threshold defenses have been
proposed to and subsequently employed by lower courts to reject takings claims"). The
authors believe this regulation-friendly trend is likely to continue. Id. at 364-65 ("Because
many [Lucas] defenses are a product of state law, it does not seem likely that the Supreme
Court... could arrest this proliferation, even if it wanted to do so.").
264Id. at 354-59 (observing that "[a]lthough Justice Scalia's Lucas majority opinion
cautioned against employing legislatively decreed background principles, many post-Lucas
courts have sided with Justice Kennedy's Lucas concurrence to hold that state and federal
statutes may function as a threshold bar to takings challenges").
20 See infra notes 266-275 and accompanying text.
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which governments can defeat compensation suits without
case-specific inquiries into the economic effects and public
purposes of regulations. Lucas accomplished this by establishing the prerequisite that a claimant must first demonstrate
that its property interest was unrestrained by prior restric266
tions.
The government's defense becomes categorical primarily in cases
where it rests upon background principles of property (such as the
public trust doctrine, the natural use doctrine, the navigational servitude, customary rights, water law principles, the wildlife trust, and In2
dian treaty rights),267 rather than upon principles of nuisance. 6
Second, although Lucas contemplates an antecedent inquiry into
269
the landowner's property interest only in the case of total takings,
lower courts have begun to put landowner property interests under
the microscope in all takings cases. 2 70 As a result, the principle ques271
tion in a traditional takings analysis-did the government go too far? has been postponed until after consideration of the antecedent question, did the landowner go too Jfar?2 72 In practical terms, this may have
leveled the playing field between public and private interests. It might
also defuse the modern one-sided rhetoric of rights that portrays
landowners as the victims of governmental regulators, without regard
for important community values that government regulations may
protect. 273 As a result of this preliminary opportunity to state their
case, regulators can now defeat takings liability during the early stages
2

66 Blunmm & Ritchie, supranote 116, at 322.
at 341-54 (describing background principles of property law that have been, or
may be, employed to defeat takings challenges).
268
Id. at 334 n.75 (noting that nuisance remains inherently a balancing test).
269As Lucas explained:
267 Id.

The "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail ... analysis
of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, the social value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in
question, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent
private landowners) alike.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31 (citations omitted).
270 See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 116, at 322 (asserting that "[iln effect, the Lucas
decision fundamentally revised all takings analysis by making the nature of the landowner's property rights a threshold issue in every takings case").
271 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
272 See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 116, at 322.
23

See supra notes 28-82 and accompanying text.
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of litigation by demonstrating that the landowner never had the unfettered right to engage in the regulated activity. 274 In such cases,
courts need not address the additional Penn Central factors that may
favor landowners, including the degree of interference with reasonable, investment-backed expectations, and the economic impact of
2 75
the challenged regulation.
2. New Nuisance as Offense
By focusing attention upon the traditional doctrine of nuisance,
Lucas breathed new life into an old body of law, turning it into an important governmental defense. 276 Moreover, this attention to defensive
nuisance may have triggered a renewed appreciation of the doctrine's
usefulness in its more common offensive posture. 277 It is impossible to
demonstrate a precise cause-and-effect relationship between Lucas and
subsequent affirmative nuisance actions. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy
that a number of novel nuisance lawsuits were filed in the fifteen years
following Lucas. 278 Among these are public nuisance claims filed against

nontraditional defendants-the manufacturers of products such as
guns, lead paint, tobacco, and gasoline.2 79 Post-Lucaslawsuits have also
alleged nontraditional harms, such as the loss of a subsistence fishing
lifestyle caused by an Alaskan oil spill, 2s° or warming of the global climate caused by the emission of carbon dioxide from electrical utilities. 281

274See supra notes 259-272 and accompanying text.
275 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
276See supra notes 259-275 and accompanying text.
277 See Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 89,
91 (1998) (asserting that the law of regulatory takings has "restored" the law of nuisance
"to the agenda of regulators, legislators, and planners"); infra notes 278-281 and accompanying text. But see Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of
the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 759 (2001) (describing how the "special injury 278
rule" substantially limits the utility of the public nuisance cause of action).
See infra notes 279-281 and accompanying text.
279 See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: MaintainingRational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN LJ. 541, 543 (2006) (describing the targets of recent public nuisance claims).
280 See Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs' public nuisance claim for failure to demonstrate that they suffered a special
injury different in kind from all citizens of Alaska).
281 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y 2005)
(dismissing action as nonjusticiable political question), appeal docketed, No. 05-5104 (2d
Cir. Sept. 22, 2005); infra notes 488-493.
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3. New Nuisance as Legislative Catalyst
The new interest in both defensive and offensive nuisance-as
triggered by Lucas-may serve to clarify the relationship between development activity and negative environmental consequences. As courts
recognize connections between cause and effect, actors may become
more cognizant of their potential liability for actions that harm wetlands, disrupt natural environments, and release greenhouse gases into
the atmosphere. 282 As legal precedent and new learning evolve-and as
liability becomes more likely-the industry decision-making process
2 83
will undoubtedly respond.
At some undefined tipping point, it may become more cost effective for the regulated community to shape, rather than resist, legislation. 284 As a result, industry may find it more favorable to engage in

the development of comprehensive federal legislation than to initiate
numerous individual takings lawsuits or to comply with a variety of
state laws. Moreover, some entrepreneurial actors may come to embrace federal legislation as a consistent baseline that creates a potentially profitable market for technological innovation. Those who adapt
first may find lucrative opportunities to develop compliance tools that
others may adopt.

See infra notes 285-311, 319-333, 401-423, 445-457 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 523-532 and accompanying text.
4 Dean Scott, Boucher Tells Coal Industry Bill Is Coming; Pelosi, DingellEnd Dispute over Select Pane 38 ENV'T REp. 302, 302 (Feb. 9, 2007) (describing a warning by the head of a
House of Representatives energy subcommittee to the coal industry that "federal legislation limiting greenhouse gas emissions is inevitable and [the coal industry] would be better off working with Congress on a proposal than risk facing a more stringent bill from the
next administration").
282
283
28
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B. The New Learning:Environmental Connectivity
[Clhangedcircumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so.
28
-Justice Antonin Scalia 5
New appreciationof the significance of endangered species, the importance
of wetlands, and the vulnerability of coastallands shapes our evolving understandingsofproperty rights.
28 6
-Justice John Paul Stevens
The contemporary emphasis on rights rather than responsibility
has skewed the current perception of the natural world. In particular,
community efforts to protect the environment have been construed as
"taking" something away from regulated actors, but there has been
little serious consideration of whether individual development activities may also "take" something away from the community. As science
reveals more about the ecological consequences of human development activity, it becomes apparent that just as public interest regulation may adversely impact certain developers, so also may those developers have adverse impacts upon their neighbors. 287 The doctrine
of regulatory takings has been slow to recognize this two-way relationship. In theory, traditional takings law has long recognized a nuisance
exception under which landowners are not entitled to compensation
288
when they are precluded from using their land to create a nuisance.
In actual practice, however, some modern courts have been reluctant
to recognize that everyday development activities may actually harm
2 9
the community in a nuisance-like fashion. 8

285 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031; see also Reich, An Ecological View, supra note 183, at 744
(concluding that "[the environmental principle should warn us that, because all life is
interconnected, none of us can escape the consequences of suffering in our midst").
286 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
287 See infra notes 319-333, 339-423, 445-457 and accompanying text.
288 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (requiring no compensation where law impeded quarry operation in residential area); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272, 279-80 (1928) (requiring no compensation where government ordered destruction
of diseased cedar trees to protect neighboring orchards); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 411-12 (1915) (requiring no compensation where ordinance prohibited operation of
a brick yard within city limits); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1887) (requiring no
compensation where law prohibited manufacture of alcoholic beverages).
289 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024 (reasoning that "the distinction between 'harm-preventing'
[without compensation] and 'benefit-conferring' [requiring compensation] regulation is
often in the eye of the beholder" and concluding that "[iit is quite possible to describe in
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Despite this judicial skepticism, modern scholarship has begun to
identify the correlation between action and consequence.29 0 In particular, some scholars have begun to recognize what this Article calls environmental connectivity, the inverse relationship between the development
of land (and the use of other natural resources) and community welfare. This body of work moves beyond the traditional narrative under
which the land developer "gives" (jobs and other benefits) and the
government "takes," recognizing instead a bilateral relationship.29 1 At
least three broad theoretical aspects of this literature are particularly
292
relevant to the issue of regulatory takings.
First, the field of law and economics has developed the concept of
.externalities," the recognition that actions often have outside consequences not fully borne, or even considered, by the actors.29 3 As long as
these externalities remain unidentified, actors are able to escape responsibility for some of the negative consequences of their actions, and
fail to receive recognition for the full scope of the benefits of their actions. The spillover of costs and/or benefits is instead borne by the
public. Government, therefore, must carefully identify the complete
range of externalities flowing from a particular action before it can
fashion any effective system of regulations, incentives, or rewards. In
other words, it is a proper role of government to "internalize" externalities,29 4 thereby requiring actors to absorb the negative impacts of their
actions, rather than to foist them onto the community.
A second aspect of the new learning specifically applies the economic theory of externalities to the law of regulatory takings.2 95 Contrary to the conventional wisdom-which begins with a concern for
fairness to landowners-some modern scholars have emphasized fairness to communities. For example, an article in the Yale Law Journal
entitled Givings examines the positive externalities of numerous government programs, ranging from zoning changes beneficial to certain
property owners, to relaxation of environmental regulations, to the

eitherfashion the ecological, economic, and aesthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina legislature in the present case").
290 See infa notes 293-311 and accompanying text.
291See infta notes 293-311 and accompanying text.
292See infranotes 293-311 and accompanying text.
293See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
294 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 Am. ECON. Riv. 347,
347 (1967).
295See infra notes 296-302 and accompanying text.
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granting of licenses. 296 Restating traditional takings doctrine from the
perspective of the community, the authors argue:
[I]t is inequitable to bestow a benefit upon some people
that, in all fairness and justice, should be given to the public
as a whole. In a giving, a small group is able to force the public as a whole to subsidize the group's preferential treatment.
For example, when the state permits logging companies to
chop down trees innational forests for lumber, it is forcing
the public as a whole to surrender natural resources for the
297
private profit of the logging companies.
Asserting that "takings and givings are so inextricably related that
one cannot have a coherent takings jurisprudence without an attendant giving jurisprudence, "29s the authors construct an elaborate
model for identifying, assessing, and collecting fair charges for givings. 299 As an alternative method to promote an evenhanded application of the takings doctrine, some scholars use the language of "rights,"
recognizing the rights of communities (as "receptors"), as well as the
rights of property owners (as "generators").3°° In the context of pollution, these scholars argue that the law should focus upon the property
rights of receptors of pollutants, rather than the generators of pollution.3 01 They conclude that the present system "effectively subsidize[s]
polluters by permitting them to deposit waste into public and private
property and to use the population as test subjects while unconstitu30 2
tionally taking their property rights."
A third strand of modern learning studies and quantifies the
numerous benefits produced by healthy ecosystems. 30 3 Stanford con96 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 550 (2001).
27 Compare id. at 554, with Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that the takings clause prevents the government from "forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole").
298 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 296, at 552.
299Id. at 604-08.
300Robert H. Cutting, "One Man's Ceilin' Is Another Man's Floor": Property Rights as the
Double-Edged Sword, 31 ENvrL. L. 819, 819 (2001); Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, Thinking Outside the Box: Property Rights as a Key to Environmental Protection, 22 PACE
ENVTL. L. Riv. 55, 56 (2005).
301Cutting, supra note 300, at 819; Cutting & Cahoon, supra note 300, at 56.
"02Cutting & Cahoon, supra note 300, at 55; see alsoJoseph L. Sax, Essay: Why America
Has a Property Rights Movemen 2005 U. ILL. L. Rxv. 513, 513-14; Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatizationof Water, 1 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENvrL. L.
& PoL'v 13, 14-15 (1994).
o30
See infra notes 304-311 and accompanying text.
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servation biologist Gretchen Daily and others conducted pioneering
research in "ecosystem services," observing that "environments of interacting plants, animals, and microbes ... can be seen as capital as-

sets, supplying human beings with a stream of services that sustain
and enhance our lives." 304 Their work seeks to measure, capture, and
protect the newly discovered values before they are lost.30 5 Ecosystem

services can provide a broad range of benefits to society, often quite
unexpected. 30 6 For example, Richard Louv's 2005 book, Last Child in
the Woods: Saving Our Children from Nature-DeficitDisorder, argues that
the modern alienation from nature-termed "nature-deficit disorder"--damages children, and that exposure to nature could provide a
therapy for depression, obesity, and attention-deficit disorder.30 7 A related body of work studies "natural capital," defined as "the stock that
yields the flow of natural resources-the population of fish in the
ocean that regenerates the flow of caught fish that go to market; the
standing forest that regenerates the flow of cut timber .... -308 Natural
capital yields both natural resources and natural services. 3 0 9 Like traditional forms of capital, these scholars argue, natural capital should
be maintained intact. 310 Still other scholars focus on reform of cost304 See generally GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF
NATURE: THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE 5 (2002); NATURE'S SERVICES:

SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997); Robert L.
Fischman, The EPA's NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 497 (2001);
J.B. Ruhl & R.Juge Gregg, IntegratingEcosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case Study
of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365 (2001); James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001).
Courts have also begun to acknowledge the value of ecosystem services. See, e.g., Gallenthin
Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 464 (N.J. 2007) (invalidating classification of wedand as "in need of redevelopment" and therefore subject to eminent domain, and noting the "host of social goods" provided by freshwater wetlands).
305 See generally DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 304; NATURE'S SERVICES, supra note 304;
Fischman, supra note 304; Ruhl & Gregg, supra note 304; Salzman et al., supra note 304.
306 See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:

SYNTHESIS 103-22 (2005) (describing the benefits to people from a range of services provided by natural ecosystems including: the provision of food, fresh water, timber, fiber and
fuel; the contribution of genetic resources to commercial products; climate, disease, waste,
and natural hazard regulation; and nutrient cycling).
307 RICHARD Louv, LAST CHILD IN THE WOODS: SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM NATURE-

DEFICIT DISORDER 3 (2005); see also David A. Dana, Existence Value and FederalPreservation
Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 343 (2004). See generallyJARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SoCIETIEs CHOOSE To FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005) (describing how the depletion
of natural resources has contributed to societal collapse).
308 HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-

(1996).
w9 Id.
310 Id. at 76.

MENT 80
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benefit analysis. They argue that ecosystem services and natural capital are consistently undervalued in cost-benefit analyses because such
assets are external to traditional economic markets. 311 Overall, the
literature on externalities, givings, ecosystem services, and related disciplines provides fertile support for the modern evolution of nuisance
doctrine, as stimulated by Lucas.
V.

THE

NEW NUISANCE

APPLIED: CONNECTING THE

DOTS

This Part applies the new nuisance doctrine to three difficult environmental problems-wedand development, sprawling land use patterns, and global warming. 312 Each problem is exacerbated, in part,
when landowners, developers, and ordinary citizens are allowed to
harm environmental resources without bearing (or perhaps even knowing) the full economic, environmental, and social costs of their actions.3 13 As considered below, new nuisance law may be an appropriate

vehicle to allocate these environmental costs, shifting responsibility
back to the actors whose enterprises inflict nuisance-like harms upon
314

society.

The discussion begins with a survey of the evolving new knowledge of the relationship between resource destruction and public
harm.3 15 It then traces three aspects of the post-Lucas evolution of the
law: 1) the extent to which communities have successfully asserted the
Lucas affirmative defense to avoid takings liability for wetland, land
use, and global warming regulation; 316 2) the extent to which offensive public nuisance lawsuits have succeeded when alleging environmental harms; 317 and, in the context of climate change, 3) the extent

to which the new learning has induced the regulated community to
accept responsibility for its actions, paving the way for the passage of
new environmental legislation likely to escape facial challenge under
318
the regulatory takings doctrine.

311

See generally LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-

BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

s12 See infranotes
313 See infranotes
314 See infra notes
315 See infranotes
316 See infranotes
317 See infranotes
318 See infranotes

(2002).

319-536 and accompanying text.
319-333, 394-423, 445-457 and accompanying
319-536 and accompanying text.
319-333, 394-423, 445-457 and accompanying
334-387, 424-437, 458-470 and accompanying
388-393, 438-443, 473-502 and accompanying
503-536 and accompanying text.
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A. Wetland Destruction as New Nuisance

1. The New Learning on Wetlands
Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, undesirable, and
not picturesque. But as the people became more sophisticated, an apprecia-

tion was acquired that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature,
are part of the balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water
in our lakes and streams. Swamps and wetlands are a necessary part of the
ecological creation and now, even to the uninitiated, possess their own
beauty in nature.
3 19

-Just v. Marinette County

Modern studies have revealed that wetlands perform a vast range
of ecosystem services for the community.3 20 The Environmental Protec3 21
tion Agency (the "EPA") has identified at least five such functions
and studies have begun to quantify the economic value of the services
performed. 322 First, wetlands improve water quality by processing, decomposing, and trapping inorganic nutrients, organic wastes, and suspended solids that would otherwise pollute surface waters. 323 Sitespecific studies have valued this service in excess of $1 million for individual communities.3 24 Second, wetlands provide protection against
319 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
320 See infra notes 321-333 and accompanying text.
321See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FUNCTIONS AND VALUES OF WETLANDS (2001) [here-

inafter EPA, FUNCTIONS AND VALUES],
pdf/fun._al.pdf.

available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wedands/

322 See generally EDWARD B. BERBIER ET AL., ECONOMIC VALUATION OF WETLANDS: A
GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS AND PLANNERS

(1997),

available at http://www.ransar.org/

lib/libvaluation_e.htm; Richard P. Novitzki et al., Restoration, Creation, and Recovery of Wetlands: Wetland Functions, Values, and Assessment, (U.S. Geological Survey Water Supply Paper
2425), available at http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/functions.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2007); N.C. State Univ., Water Quality Group, Wetland Functions (or Processes)
and Values, http://www.water.ncsu.edu/watershedss/info/wedands/funval.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
323 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERSHED ACADEMY WEB, WETLAND FUNCTIONS
AND VALUES 6 [hereinafter EPA, WATERSHED ACADEMY WEB], available at http://www.epa.

gov/watertrain/wetlands/index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
324 Id. Two examples cited by the EPA include the Congaree Bottomland Hardwood
Swamp of South Carolina, which .removes a quantity of pollutants that would be equivalent to that removed annually by a $5 million waste water treatment plant" according to a
1990 study, and a 2500 acre wedand in Georgia that saves one million dollars annually in
pollution abatement costs. Id. Wetlands improve the flow (or hydrology) of water, as well as
its quality. Id. For example, "[olne calculation for a 5-acre Florida cypress swamp recharging groundwater was that, if 80 percent of swamp was drained, available ground water
would be reduced by an estimated 45 percent." Id.
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floods, hurricanes, and shoreline erosion by storing excess waters and
releasing them slowly.3 25 A Minnesota study found that the draining of
five thousand wetland acres destroyed natural flood control valued at
$1.5 million annually.3 26 Even more striking, a Mississippi River basin
study found that wedand destruction and levee construction had reduced the basin's natural storage capacity from sixty days of floodwater
to twelve days of floodwater.3 27 Third, wetlands provide habitat for fish,
wildlife, and plants, making them "some of the most biologically productive natural ecosystems in the world, comparable to tropical rain
forests and coral reefs .... "328 This habitat supports a commercial and
recreational fishing industry valued at approximately $79 billion annually.329 Fourth, wetlands help to maintain favorable atmospheric conditions by storing carbon in peat, thus helping to control global warming.33 0 When drained or filled, wetlands release the carbon as carbon
dioxide, a greenhouse gas that affects the earth's climate.3 31 Finally, wet33 2
lands provide aesthetic, recreational, and educational opportunities.
Studies estimate that Americans spend more than $59 billion annually
in connection with wetland-related hunting, fishing, bird watching, and
333
wildlife photography.

32- Id. at

7.

Id. The EPA estimates that a single wetland acre can store up to 1.5 million gallons
of floodwater. EPA, FUNCTIONS AND VALUES, supra note 321. Citing the thirty-eight deaths
and billions of dollars of damage caused by the 1993 upper Mississippi River Basin flood,
]
the EPA commented that "[h istorically, 20 million acres of wetlands in this area had been
drained or filled, mostly for agricultural purposes. If the wetlands had been preserved
rather than drained, much property damage and crop loss could have been avoided." Id.
326

327 EPA, WATERSHED ACADEMY WEB, supra note 323, at 7 (concluding that "in addition
to their fish and wildlife values, wetlands reduce the likelihood of flood damage to homes,
businesses, and crops in agricultural areas" and wetlands protection results in "less monetary flood damage (and related insurance costs), as well as protection of human health,
safety, and welfare"). As a related function, wetlands adjacent to open water provide erosion protection and "buffer the storm surges from hurricanes and tropical storms by dissipating wave energy before it impacts roads, houses, and other man-made structures." Id. at
8.
328
329

EPA, FUNCTIONS AND VALUES, supra note 321.
Id. (citing 1997 data from the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associa-

tions).

EPA, WATERSHED
Id.
Id. at 10, 11.
333 Id. at 10.
330
331
332

ACADEMY WEB,

supranote 323, at 3.
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2. Defending Wetland Regulations
Coastalproperty may present such unique concernsfor aftagile land system
that the State can go further in regulatingits development and use than the
common law of nuisance might otherwisepermit.
-Justice

Anthony Kennedy3M

a. Wetland Destructionas CategoricalDefense

In the post-Lucas era, a number of state and federal courts have
held that governmental efforts to protect wetlands do not constitute
regulatory takings because wetland destruction constitutes a nuisance. 335 Generally, these courts apply the Supreme Court's 1992 new
nuisance defense of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci4 in the con-

text of the balancing test developed by the Court in 1978, in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York. 336 The state courts of Massachu-

setts, 337 Pennsylvania, 33 8 and Rhode Island 339 have based their holdings

334 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
335 See infra notes 336-340 and accompanying text.
3
See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 116, at 327-28 (discussing background principles
as categorical takings defense); id. at 336 (arguing that a "nuisance defense is particularly
appropriate in the case of wetlands protection").
337 See Commonwealth v. Blair, No. CIVA 98-2758-G, 2000 WL 875903, at *2, 9 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 6, 2000) (rejecting takings challenge to state statute prohibiting the alteration of land within 200 feet of surface waters within protected watersheds supplying public
drinking water), affirmed as modified, 805 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). The trial
court held:

The rights of a property owner to utilize lakefront property comes with significant limitations when the regulatory concern is for the health and welfare
of society. Conduct affecting a public resource, such as public water supplies,
that could be actionable at common law.., under a public nuisance theory,
may be aptly regulated, or at minimum, be regulated with a decreased risk of
having the regulation adjudicated an unconstitutional taking.... The character of the government action here, therefore, is much akin to prohibiting acts
which may have been prohibited, at least in part, at common law prior to the
enactment of the [challenged wetlands protection statute] in 1992.
Id. at *7. The appellate court did not disturb this holding in its modified affirmance. See
Blair,805 N.E.2d at 1019. Other Massachusetts courts have come to similar conclusions. See
Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 831 N.E.2d 865, 875 (Mass. 2005) (rejecting
takings challenge to denial of permit to build single-family house on undeveloped land
within coastal conservancy district). In Gove v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham, the trial
court had found that the subject property was located within a flood plain, and that construction of the proposed house would pose a danger to neighboring landowners. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded: "Reasonable govern-
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on explicit findings that the destruction of wetlands or other aquatic
resources constitutes a public nuisance.
Of particular interest to government regulators is the Supreme
Court's 2001 final resolution of the decades-long Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island litigation. 3 4° In 1985, a Rhode Island landowner sought permission to fill and develop approximately eighteen acres of coastal salt
marsh. 341 The relevant state agency denied permission pursuant to
state regulation. 342 The landowner brought an inverse condemnation
action, alleging that denial of his application constituted a regulatory
taking. 343 Ultimately, the case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court,
which held that the claim was ripe for review, and that the landowner's acquisition of tide after the effective date of the state's wetland regulation was not an automatic bar to the takings claim. 344 Finding that the challenged regulation had not deprived the petitioner of
all economically beneficial use of his property, the Court remanded
for a resolution of the takings claim under the Penn Central test.345 In
an earlier phase of the litigation, the Rhode Island trial court had
found that the contemplated wedand development would constitute a
public nuisance. 346 Eight years later, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the trial court again found that the proposed wetland
ment action mitigating such harm, at the very least when it does not involve a 'total' regulatory taking or a physical invasion, typically does not require compensation." Id.
338 See Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 774 (Pa.
2002) (rejecting takings challenge to state regulation designating a particular watershed as
unsuitable for mining). Independent of evidence that the proposed mining operation
would destroy a trout population and adversely impact water supply, the court stated, "we
have explained that 'we believe that the public has a sufficient interest in clean streams
alone regardless of any specific use thereof... [to warrant] injunctive relief.'" Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d, 871, 882 (Pa. 1974)).
33 See infra notes 340-350 and accompanying text; see also Milardo v. Coastal Res.
Mgmt. Council, 434 A.2d 266, 268-69 (R.I. 1981) (pre-Lucas decision holding that there is
no property right to fill wetlands because it would impair public resources).
30 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (Palazzolo I), 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (holding 1986
denial of application for dredge-and-fill permit for beach facility ripe for review under
Penn Centralanalysis); infra notes 341-350 and accompanying text.
341 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (Palazzolo II), No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at
*1 & n.2 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005). The State Coastal Resources Management Council
had denied two previous permit applications submitted by Palazzolo. Id. at *1 nn.2 & 4.
342 Id. Under the Coastal Resources Management Plan of 1976, state regulations prohibited the filling of certain coastal wetlands without a special exception. Id. at *1 n.3.
34 PalazzoloI, 533 U.S. at 615-16.
34
35

Id. at 632.
Id.

346 See Palazzolo II, 2005 WL 1645974, at *1 (discussing 1997 judgment of the Rhode Island Superior Court after seven-day bench trial).
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development would be a public nuisance.3 47 The court concluded
that, without more, nuisance would serve as a "preclusive defense" 348
to the landowner's takings claim:
The State has presented evidence as to various effects that the
development will have including increasing nitrogen levels in
the pond, both by reason of the nitrogen produced by the attendant residential septic systems, and the reduced marsh
area which actually filters and cleans runoff. This Court finds
that the effects of increased nitrogen levels constitute a predictable (anticipatory) nuisance which would almost certainly
result in an ecological disaster to the pond.... Nor is the
proposed high density subdivision suitable for the salt marsh
environs presented here.3 49
In so concluding, the court was impressed by the array of ecosystem
services that would be curtailed by the filling of coastal marshlands. 3 5 0
In contrast to these regulatory-friendly decisions in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, courts in the Federal Circuit
specifically rejected the new nuisance defense of Lucas four times before or during 2001.351 These decisions were based on the law of nui-

sance in the states of California,35 2 Florida,35 3 Delaware,3 54 and New

347 Id.
348

at *5.

Id.
349
Id.
350 See id.

-51 See infra notes 352-355 and accompanying text.
See Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that
the proposed dredging and filling of a lake bottom to promote residential construction
would not constitute a nuisance under California law. Id. Nevertheless, the court rejected
the takings challenge, finding that the landowner lacked reasonable expectations that it
could develop its property as proposed. Id. at 1366-67.
35 See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 28-32, 42 (1999) (finding
that denial of section 404 permit in connection with limestone mining operation constituted a regulatory taking). The court concluded:
552

[P]laintiff's limestone mining operation would, like similar operations in the
vicinity, result in only moderate, superficial pollution that does no harm, and
would not be considered a nuisance under the relevant Florida laws. Indeed,
plaintiff's operation was suitably located in the community and designed to
help meet the community's need for aggregates to be used in construction.
Id. at 31-32.
34 See Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 270 (2001), aff'd, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). In Walcek v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims found:
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Jersey,35 5 with the federal courts concluding that government defen-

dants failed to demonstrate that their challenged actions were designed to prevent common law nuisance under the relevant state's
law.3 56 Importantly--despite rejecting the argument under Lucas that
wetland destruction is a nuisance under state law-two of these cases
nevertheless held in favor of the governmental defendants under the
3 57

broader Penn Central test.

b. Wetland Destructionas Nuisance-Like BalancingFactor
Numerous other courts have found that the fill or development
of wetlands may cause community harm, and that governments may
regulate to prevent such harm without providing compensation to the

There is no significant evidence in this case that the plaintiffs' proposed use
of the Property [filling and development of salt marsh] would formally constitute a nuisance under Delaware state law so that the application of the Federal wetland regulations could be viewed as enforcing a limitation already inherent in the Property.
Id. Nevertheless, the court rejected the takings challenge, finding acceptable the character
of the government action to protect wetlands. Id. at 272.
s55See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1182-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding denial of section 404 permit to constitute a regulatory taking, denying landowner
of all economically beneficial use of NewJersey wedand property), abrogated by Bass Enters.
Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit agreed with
the trial court's conclusion that the federal defendant had failed to sustain its burden of
proving that wedand filling constituted a common law nuisance. Id. at 1183. Ironically, the
Federal Circuit preceded its holding in favor of the landowner with an impassioned paragraph extolling the value of wetlands:
There can be no doubt today that every effort must be made individually and
collectively to protect our natural heritage, and to pass it to future generations unspoiled. The destruction of ancient civilizations by human misuse of
the environment, such as that at Ephesus, teaches the need for public policies
that work within the natural environment, rather than attempt radically to al-

ter

it.

Id. at 1175. Loveadies has been discredited on other grounds. See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v.
United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (recognizing "a return to the preLucas evaluation of the 'character of the Government actions' factor"); see also Mansoldo v.
NewJersey, 898 A.2d 1018, 1025 (N.J. 2006) (rejecting argument that landowner's stipulation that proposed development in flood plain "would pose a threat to other properties
during a flood" constituted a concession that intended use of property is a nuisance under
Lucas).
s56ContraJohnR. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 230, 240 n.6 (2004)
(suggesting that in absence of controlling law in the relevant state, government regulators
may cite to persuasive evidence that the subject activity would constitute a nuisance in
other jurisdictions).
s57See supra notes 352 (applying California law) and 354 (applying Delaware law).
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burdened landowner.3 58 These courts stop short of describing wetland
destruction as a "nuisance," but have nevertheless been willing to reject takings challenges to regulations that preclude nuisance-like activities.3 59 This group includes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed363
3 61
Florida,36 2 Michigan,
eral Circuit,3 60 as well as the states of Alaska,
358 See generally Fred P. Bosseslman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common
Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996); Gina Schilmoeller, Invoking the Fifth Amendment to
Preserveand Restore the Nation's Wetlands in CoastalLouisiana, 19 TbL. ENVTL. LJ. 317 (2006).
359 See infra notes 360-370 and accompanying text.
mt See Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 286 (2004), affd, 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2288 (2006) (rejecting takings challenge to wetland mitigation requirement imposed on Nevada property under section 404 permitting process,
and approving character of government action "especially in light of the fact that the government has a legitimate public welfare obligation to preserve wetlands and that the unnecessary destruction of wetlands violates environmental laws and is contrary to public
policy"); John R. Sand & Grave4 60 Fed. Cl. at 243-45, 251 (remanding for factual development of record in takings challenge to administrative use of Michigan mining property
during environmental remediation of neighboring landfill, and suggesting that the pollution of ground water may constitute a public or private nuisance); Brace. v. United States,
48 Fed. Cl. 272, 278-79 (2000) (remanding for factual development of record in takings
challenge to administrative order prohibiting drainage of wetlands, and approving character of the government action implementing its "legitimate public welfare obligation to
preserve our nation's wetlands"); see also Waleek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 272 (rejecting takings challenge to issuance of section 404 permit allowing only scaled-down version of proposed
development). The Wacek court specifically rejected the government's categorical nuisance defense, see id. at 270, but nevertheless approved the character of the government
action. Id. (opining that "the existence of the wetland regulations in question, as well as
their application to the Property, indisputably serve an important public purpose--one
which benefits plaintiffs as members of the public at large"). The court concluded that:

while the absence of a nuisance certainly cuts in favor of a finding of a taking,
other circumstances in this case [including the importance of preserving
ecologically significant areas and the general applicability of wetland regulations to all similarly situated property owners] ameliorate somewhat the impact of the [character of the government action] Penn Central factor in this
regard.
Id.; see also Forest Properties, 177 F.3d at 1367 (rejecting takings challenge to denial of section 404 permit to convert lake-bottom property into residential development). The Forest
Properties court specifically rejected the government's categorical nuisance defense, id. at
1366, but nevertheless found that the developer lacked reasonable investment-backed
expectations because at the time the developer acquired an option to purchase lake bottom property, "the Corps' guidelines governing the issuance of Section 404 permits under
the Clean Water Act had been in effect for a number of years," making clear that, "filling
wetlands to construct housing on the reclaimed land was disfavored and that it was most
unlikely that such a project would be approved." Id. at 1366-67.
361 See R & Y, Inc. v. Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 300 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting regulatory
taking challenge to municipal regulation prohibiting development within 100 feet of particular wetland). In upholding the uncompensated governmental regulation, the court
noted the ecosystem services provided by wetlands, concluding, "In preserving the valuable functions of wetlands, regulations like those of the [municipality of Anchorage] pro-
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68

Washington, 369

and

Wisconsin.3 70

66

Oregon, 367 South Caro-

Although the nuisance de-

vide ecological and economic value to the landowners whose surrounding commerciallydeveloped land is directly and especially benefited by the functioning of Blueberry Lake."
Id. at 298. The court was influenced, in part, by the comprehensive nature of wetlands
regulation. Id. at 298, 300.
362 See Florida v. Burgess, 772 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting regulatory taking challenge to denial of dredge-and-fill permit for construction of dock,
boardwalk, and camping shelter on undeveloped 160-acre wetland). The court rejected
the claim that an undeveloped wetland was valueless, concluding that the landowner "utterly failed to demonstrate that the permit denial deprived him of all reasonable economic
use of his land." Id. at 543; see also Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380-83
(Fla. 1981) (in pre-Lucas decision, rejecting regulatory taking challenge to denial of development permit that would have destroyed 1800 acres of black mangrove wetland). In upholding the denial of the permit application in Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., the court
noted that, under the facts of the case, wetland development would pollute the surrounding bays and "cause a public harm." Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1382-83 (stressing "the magnitude of [the] proposed development and the sensitive nature of the surrounding lands
and water to be affected by it").
-63 See K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 386 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005) (reversing trial court takings award in amount of $16.5 million for denial of
application for dredge-and-fill permit), appeal denied, 713 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 2006). The
court concluded that that the permit denial would prevent significant harm to the public.
Id. at 369 (citing to findings of state legislature that the "loss of a wetland may deprive the
people of the state of some or all of the ... benefits to be derived from the wetland"). The
court was cognizant that its decision would prevent the developer from externalizing the
costs of wetland destruction: "Indeed, were we to uphold the trial court's award, we would,
in effect, single out plaintiffs to their benefit, [by] compensating plaintiffs for the loss of
value of their property, especially when it has a significant amount of value and development potential remaining ... ." Id. at 385-86; see also Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 7172 (Mich. 2005) (generously interpreting the public trust doctrine to extend along the
Great Lakes to the ordinary high water mark landward of the wet sand), reh'g denied, 703
N.W.2d 188 (Mich. 2005), cert. denied sub nom., 546 U.S. 1174(2006).
364 See Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984) (in pre-Lucas decision, holding that denial of permit to fill tidal marshes was not a taking because filling
the marsh would harm the public by "irreparably diminishing the marsh's nutrient producing capability for coastal habitats and marine fisheries"). The court consciously
grounded its decision in the new learning on wetlands, observing that "[t]he dangers associated with filling wetlands have only recently become widely known". Id.
36 Am. Dredging Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 391 A.2d 1265, 1270 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1978) (in pre-Lucas decision, holding that there is "no absolute right to change the
essential character" of land), affd, 404 A.2d 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979). In 2006,
however, the Supreme Court of NewJersey required the state to compensate a landowner
who had been precluded from building two single-family homes in a river floodway, even
though the court acknowledged "the laudatory goal of limiting flood damage and loss of
life along the river," and that the regulation prevented a public danger to the community.
Mansoldo, 898 A.2d at 1020-24.
366 See Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 313 (N.Y 1997) (rejecting takings
claim where city placed fill on plaintiffs' property and state property law required property
owners to maintain lateral support for public highway).
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termination is heavily fact-specific, the cases provide fertile ground for
extracting the factors likely to influence courts in future litigation. It
is useful to group those factors according to the three prongs of the
analysis established in Penn Central.
In a Penn Central analysis, courts first consider the economic impact of the challenged regulation. 371 In Lucas, the U.S. Supreme Court
accepted a case where the state supreme court had previously found
that the challenged regulation rendered the subject property "valueless."

72

Subsequent courts, however, have demonstrated a less skeptical

view of the worth of natural lands, perhaps reflecting the evolution of
scientific knowledge on the value of wetlands and other aquatic re373
sources.
367See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993) (rejecting takings claim where common law doctrine of custom precluded hotel from erecting sea wall
on dry sand area of Oregon beach).
68 See Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (rejecting takings
claim where landowner was precluded from filling critical area tidelands under state tidelands statute). But see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992) (remand). On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
explained:
We have reviewed the record and heard arguments from the parties regarding whether [the state] possesses the ability under the common law to prohibit Lucas from constructing a habitable structure on his land. [The state]
has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas's desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any
such common law principle.
Id.

s See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1088 (Wash. 1987) (remanding takings
claim based on the denial of a construction permit for consideration of the public trust
doctrine).
370 See Just, 201 N.W.2d at 772 (in pre-Lucas decision, rejecting takings challenge to
county shoreland zoning ordinance establishing buffer zone along navigable lakes and
rivers along which the natural character of the land may not be changed without a conditional use permit). The court noted that the challenged ordinance was designed to protect
navigable waters and public rights from degradation and deterioration, and observed "the
interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural environment of shorelands
to the purity of the water and to such natural resources as navigation, fishing, and scenic
beauty." Id. at 765, 768-69; see also Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 116, at 344-46 (discussing
the "natural use doctrine" of Just and its progeny).
37 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying
several analytical factors of "particular significance," including "the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant," "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations," and "the character of the government action").
372See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007, 1009, 1018-19; supra note 89 and accompanying text.
373 See, e.g., Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 543-44. The court was influenced, in part, by the facts
that "the extensive, remote wetlands adjacent to appellee's property have remained undeveloped as has [the claimant's] property," and that the claimant had made recreational use
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Under the second Penn Central factor, courts consider the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 3 74 Wetland regulators have survived takings liability in numerous cases due to the
longstanding and comprehensive regulation of wetlands under state
and federal law.375 Some courts have invoked the so-called "notice
rule,"376 finding that landowner expectations of wetland development

cannot be reasonable for properties acquired after the effective date
of the Federal Clean Water Act of 1972. 377 Other courts date the federal regulatory presence back to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
rendering vulnerable development expectations for regulated lands
purchased any time after that date. 378 The development expectations

of sophisticated or commercial landowners are also more likely to fail
the reasonableness test because such landowners may be held to a
higher standard of subjective awareness of the relevant regulatory re379
strictions on wetland development.
The final Penn Central factor is the character of the government
action. 3S° Whereas some courts have viewed the existence of a pervaof his undeveloped property for decades without the sought amenities. Id. at 544; see also
Gove, 831 N.E.2d at 872-73 (finding undeveloped coastal property to be worth at least
$23,000).
974 See Penn Centra4438 U.S. at 124.
375 See infra notes 376-379 and accompanying text.
376 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the proposition that
the purchase of lands subject to an existing regulatory scheme serves as an automatic bar to
compensation. Palazzolo I, 533 U.S. at 626-28. Five Justices agreed to invalidate the socalled "notice rule," under which a purchaser or successive title holder of a property subject to an earlier-enacted restriction is barred from asserting a regulatory takings claim. See
id. (Kennedy, J.,joined by CJ. Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.). Two Justices
would find that the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property helps to shape the reasonableness of the claimant's investment-backed expectations
under a Penn Central analysis. See id. at 632-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 654-55
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
377 See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (pre-Palazzolo
decision affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of federal defendant in takings
challenge to denial of section 404 permit, and asserting that the "Lucas Court did not hold
that the denial of all economically beneficial or productive use of land eliminates the requirement that the landowner have reasonable, investment-backed expectations of developing his land"); see also Forest Properties, 177 F.3d at 1366-67 (pre-Palazzolo decision); Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 266-70 (reasoning that the "holding in Palazzolo... is not an absolute
renunciation of the 'notice rule'"); Brace, 48 Fed. Cl. at 281 (pre-Palazzolodecision).
378 See Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 268 (pre-Palazzolodecision).
379 See Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 266 (noting that the plaintiffs were "sophisticated real estate developers"); K & K Constr, 705 N.W.2d at 369(stating that "plaintiffs are experienced
commercial land developers who clearly had or were on notice of the [state] wetland regulations").
380See Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 124.

HeinOnline -- 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1209 2007

1210

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 48:1155

sive regulatory scheme as evidence that development expectations are
unreasonable, 3 8 other courts have considered such regulations as
3 82
evidence that the government action is of an acceptable character.
According to this view, the more pervasive the statutory program, the
3ss
more likely it is to promote an "average reciprocity of advantage,"
treating all similarly-situated landowners equally, and spreading the
burdens-and benefits-of regulation across a wider spectrum of
property.3 4 Courts are also more likely to find a reciprocity of advantage where surrounding properties are similarly restricted. 385 Moreover, courts are increasingly willing to uphold government actions
intended to protect ecosystem services against harmful development
activities. 3 6 Finally, if government actions are demonstrated to abate a
nuisance-even outside the context of a total taking under Lucassome courts have found this to be a complete defense to liability,
38 7
without consideration of the additional Penn Centralfactors.

381 See supranotes 376-378 and accompanying text.
382See, e.g., R & Y, 34 P.3d at 298.
383 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3' See R & Y, 34 P.3d at 298 (observing that Anchorage's setback restriction was "part
of a city-wide (indeed, nationwide) wetlands preservation scheme which applies broadly to
all landowners and which benefits both the public generally and the landowners in particular"); K & K Constr., 705 N.W.2d at 369 (opining that wedand regulations, "much like
traditional zoning regulations, [are] comprehensive, universal, and ubiquitous").
3m Compare Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 270 (rejecting takings challenge explaining that "the
Clean Water Act and the wetlands regulations issued thereunder are generally applicable
to all similarly situated property owners"), and Burgess, 772 So. 2d at 544 (rejecting takings
challenge and noting that "the extensive, remote wetlands adjacent [the landowner's]
property have remained undeveloped"), with FloridaRock, 45 Fed. Cl. at 37 (finding a regulatory taking where "there can be no question that [the landowner] has been singled out
to bear a much heavier burden than its neighbors, without reciprocal advantages").
38' See Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 270 (stating that wetlands regulations "indisputably serve
an important public purpose"); Brace 48 Fed. Cl. at 278-79 (stating that 'wetlands serve
important environmental functions"); R & , 34 P.3d at 298 (noting that wetlands regulations "preserv[e] ... valuable functions"); Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1381-83; K & K Constr.,
705 N.W.2d at 369 (recognizing multiple benefits of wetlands regulation, including "flood
and storm control" and "protection of subsurface water resources"); Claridge, 485 A.2d at
292 (noting the wetlands board's finding that "proposed filling of this marsh would have
irreparably diminished the marsh's nutrient producing capability for coastal habitats and
marine fisheries); Am. Dredging,391 A.2d at 1270; Machipongo, 799 A-2d at 774; Palazzolo II,
2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (explaining that allowing development would destroy a "marsh
area which actually filters and cleans runoff').
387 See John R Sand & Gravel, 60 Fed. Cl. 243-45 (in context of physical taking, finding
that nuisance can serve as background principle precluding liability); Machipongo, 799
A.2d at 774; see also Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 116, at 321 (discussing Lucas's unanticipated consequence of spawning a categorical defense to regulatory takings claims).
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3. Wetland Protection as Offensive Claim
Because wetlands are critical to flood control, water supply, water quality,
and, of course, wildlife, their rapid disappearanceis setting the stage for
what may eventually become a significant environmental catastrophe.

-Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Department of the Interior 3a8
Perhaps stimulated by Lucas's focus upon the potential link between nuisance and wetland development, lower courts have increasingly recognized the value of wetlands. 389 Going beyond mere rhetoric,
in the wake of Lucas, at least one court has found that wetland destruction constitutes an affirmative nuisance. 390 In 2003, in Cook v. Sullivan,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that constructing a home
on jurisdictional wetlands constituted a private nuisance. 391 Most noteworthy is the court's remedy, which required the defendants to move
the offending house and foundation a distance of approximately fifty
feet. 392 Although acknowledging the severity of the remedy, the trial
court-as affirmed by the state supreme court-found such measures
to be justified where the defendants deliberately ignored the obvious
393
presence of wetlands and filled them without a permit.

38" Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 1992)
(describing wetlands as "an ecological treasure"); see also Allison v. Barberry Homes, Inc.,
No. 982935, 2000 WL 1473121, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (rejecting "ironic" claim that
the creation of wetlands constitutes a private nuisance, and stating that wetlands "are a precious resource-not a nuisance").
Mn See supra notes 373, 386 and accompanying text.
390 See infra notes 391-393 and accompanying text.
391 Cook v. Sullivan, 829 A.2d 1059, 1066-68 (N.H. 2003) (finding private nuisance
where defendants' construction caused standing water to accumulate in and beneath
structures on neighboring property of plaintiffs).
392 Id. at 1067-68.
39 Id.
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B. Sprawl as New Nuisance
There is a connection ... between the fact that the urban sprawl we live
with daily makes no room for sidewalks or bike paths and the fact that we
are an overweight, heart disease-riddensociety.

-RichardJ. Jackson, Center for Disease Control and Prevention

94

[Uirban sprawl has left some densely populated U.S. regions vulnerable to
flooding on a similarscale to what the Gulf Coast suffered after Hurricane
Katrina.
-USA Today3 95

The pattern of sprawling land use typically associated with low
density, suburban housing has engendered both detractors and supporters.3 96 Although the negative impacts of sprawl have received considerable study, many suburban developers and residents vigorously
support the "right to sprawl,"3 97 citing to the privacy, convenience, and
safety they believe the suburban landscape provides. 398 In appropriate
cases, new nuisance theory might be a tool capable of balancing such
perceived benefits and detriments, ensuring that a fair share of the
negative costs of sprawl are borne by those who generate them. 399 A
growing body of literature has documented the adverse, nuisance-like
impacts of sprawl. 40°

394 RICHARD

J. JACKSON &

CHRIS KOCHTITZKY, CREATING A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT.

(2002), available at http://
www.sprawlwatch.org (citing study by researchers at the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention's National Center for Environmental Health).
39 Scientists: California, St. Louis Risk Katrina-LevelFloods, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2006
[hereinafter Katrina-LevelFloods], available at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/research/
2006-02-19-floodingx.htm (citing Jeffrey Mount, University of California).
396 See infra notes 397-423 and accompanying text.
397 The Environment Report: The Right to Sprawl (Great Lakes Radio Consortium broadcast, May 5, 2003), available at http://www.environmentreport.org/transcript.php3?story
_id = 1888.
398 See Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Spraw=4 Smart Growth, and the Fifth
Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. Rav. 873, 874 n.4 (2000) (citing Bill Bishop, Urban Sprawl Makes
Comeback, LEXINGTON-HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 14, 1999, at F1 ("Sprawl doesn't hurt anybody.... [It] is the American dream.")).
39 See infra notes 424-443 and accompanying text.
400 See infra notes 401-423 and accompanying text.
THE IMPACT OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT ON PUBLIC HEALTH 3
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1. The New Learning on Sprawl
a. Economic Impacts
Perhaps the best-studied impacts of sprawl are those of an economic nature. 401 Low-density development increases the per-capita cost
of infrastructure such as roads, sewer lines, and water lines. 4 02 In addition, the isolation of residential land uses from areas zoned for shopping, employment, and service centers causes increased dependence
upon the automobile, which in turn causes increased air pollution, traffic congestion, and gasoline consumption.403 Providing a classic illustration of externalities, these costs may be reflected in the taxes of the entire region, whereas the benefits of sprawl are enjoyed primarily by
suburban residents. 404 For example, a Rutgers University study found
that prohibiting sprawl would have an economic impact of $357 million
upon a limited number of landowner/developers over twenty years,
whereas permitting sprawl would cost state residents $8 billion for otherwise unnecessary infrastructure. 4°5
b. EnvironmentalImpacts
Sprawling development exacerbates a variety of environmental
problems. 4°6 It increases automobile dependence, which in turn generates additional pollution in the operation of cars and in the production of gasoline to fuel them. In addition, low-density development
increases the consumption of wildlife habitat, agricultural lands, and
water, as such areas may give way to suburban lawns, described by one
401
402

See infra notes 402-405 and accompanying text.
See Dowling, supra note 398, at 876 (citing ROBERT H. FREILicH,

FROM SPRAWL TO

SYSTEMS 23-24
(1999)). The cost of sprawl has also been studied at the state-wide level. See id. (citing a
Maine State Planning Office study finding that expenditures for education, roads, and
police by Maine state and local governments "increased in real dollars ... during the
1980's [by] a total of over $1,300 per Maine household" and concluding that "[i]t is beyond dispute that the spreading out of Maine families is a major contributing factor to the
overall increase").
403 Henry R. Richmond, Sprawl and Its Enemies: Why the Enemies Are Losing, 34 CONN. L.
REv. 539, 572-73 (2001).
404 See, e.g., Hidden Costs of Sprawl (Great Lakes Radio Consortium broadcast June 24,
2002), available at www.grc.org/transcripts/2002/06/24/graham.htm. See generally MYRON
ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLrICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY (2002).
405 See Richmond, supra note 403, at 578 (citing ROBERT W. BURCHELL ET AL., IMPACT
SMART GROWTH:

SUCCESSFUL

LEGAL, PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT OF THE NEWJERSEY INTERIM STATE DEVELOPMENT AND REDEVELOPMENT PLAN

(1992)).
406 See infra notes 407-409 and accompanying text.
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researcher as "the largest irrigated crop in the U.S."407 Sprawl also increases water pollution, either through the application of nitrogenrich fertilizers to large suburban lawns or through the use of septic
tanks as an inexpensive alternative to municipal sewer lines. 4°8 Furthermore, the conversion of forests and farmland to suburban development may contribute to global warming. 40 9
c. Human Health and Safety Impacts
The association between air pollution, respiratory illness, and
sprawl has long been studied. More recently, researchers have begun to
explore the link between urban design and an expanded range of
health impacts, including heart disease, diabetes, obesity, asthma, and
depression. 4 10 The sprawl-obesity link has received particular attention. 41 1 An emerging subset of the sprawl literature studies the phe407 See Elizabeth Weise, As Suburbs Grow, So Do EnvironmentalFears,USA TODAY, Dec. 27,
2005, available at http://ww.usatoday.com/tech/science/2005-12-27-suburbs-environment.x.htm
(quoting Jennifer Jenkins, professor of environmental economics at the University of Vermont).
408 Id. (citing December 2005 report by the American Geophysical Union, an international association of scientists).
409 See Amy Meersman, NCAR Study: Land Use Affects Climate, DAILY CAMERA (Boulder,
Colo.), Dec. 9, 2005 (on file with author) (citing study by the National Center for Atmospheric Research indicating that deforestation will add at least two degrees Celsius to Amazon surface temperatures by the year 2100). in contrast, the expansion of agricultural
lands can counteract global warming by as much as fifty percent across various portions of
North America, Europe, and Asia. Id.
410 See generally JACKSON & KOCHTrrzKY, supra note 394. From 1960-97, vehicle miles
traveled in the United States increased by more than 250%. See id. at 6 (citing U.S. Department of Transportation report). The average annual driving time of American drivers
is 443 hours, the equivalent of eleven work weeks. Id. at 6 (citing CARL POPE, SOLVING
SPRAWL (1999), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report99/index.asp).
411 See, e.g., Reid Ewing et al., RelationshipBetween Urban Sprawl and PhysicalActivity, Obesity, and Morbidity, 18 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 47, 47 (Sept./Oct. 2003) (peer-reviewed
study citing various studies published in the Journal of the American Medical Association).
Among American adults, 64.5% are overweight and 30.5% are obese, leading to more than
300,000 premature deaths annually. Id. Such weight-related deaths are the second leading
cause of preventable death, following tobacco-related deaths. Id.; see also BARBARA A.
MCCANN & REI EWING, MEASURING THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF SPRAWL 3 (2003) (finding
that "people living in counties marked by sprawling development are likely to walk less,
weigh more, and are more likely to have high blood pressure"); Russ Lopez, Urban Sprawl
and Risk for Being Overweight or Obese, 94 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1574, 1574 (2004); Gale Norton & Michael Suk, America's Public Lands and Waters: The Gateway to Better Health, 30 AM.
J.L. & MED. 237, 237 (2004) (discussing connection between sedentary lifestyle and obesity, and suggesting use of public lands as antidote to physical inactivity); Arlin Wassereman, GainingWeight: Michigan Sprawl Increases Waistlines, Health Care Costs, MICH. LAND USE
INST., Mar. 31, 2003, available at http://mlui.org/growthmanagement/fullarticle.asp?fleid
= 16474.
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nomenon of "school sprawl"-the siting of sprawling, single-story,
modern schools at the edge of town or in areas lacking sidewalks and
bicycle paths. 412 Increasingly, children are unable to walk to school,
41 3
which in turn increases the occurrence of inactivity-related ailments.

With respect to public safety, some scientists have suggested that sprawling population patterns may increase the danger of flood-related
harm. 414 They believe that "[u] rban sprawl has left some densely popu-

lated U.S. regions vulnerable to flooding on a similar scale to what the
Gulf Coast suffered after Hurricane Katrina," including the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta of California and a fourteen thousand acre
zone in the Mississippi River floodplain of St. Louis. 415 One researcher

has asked, "If we knew about [Hurricane] Katrina 200 years ago, would
we have done the same thing again in New Orleans? ... Well, in Cali-

fornia we are reinventing our own Katrina as we speak."416
d. Social and IntangibleImpacts
Some studies indicate that deconcentrated land patterns contribute to the abandonment of urban communities, undercut economic productivity, deny equal opportunity, destabilize older suburbs,
undercut education investments, reduce public safety, and worsen
traffic congestion. 417 Other work suggests that sprawl may contribute
to the economic and racial segregation of residential neighborhoods.

418

As early as 1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil

Disorders recognized a connection between land use patterns and
racial segregation. 419 Anecdotal evidence suggests that, for some,
412 See generally David Goldberg, Sprawl vs. Small: When CanJohnny Walk to School Again,
MICH. LAND USE INST., Sept. 16, 2005, available at http://mlui.org/print.asp?fileid=16920.
413 See id. Between 1969 and 2001, the percentage of students who commuted to school

by foot or bicycle declined from approximately fifty percent to ten percent, while childhood obesity rose to thirty percent. Id. In one county study, "57% of school principals
rated the area around their schools as moderately to extremely dangerous for kids on foot
or bicycle." Id. (citing study by DeKalb, Georgia County Health Department).
414 Katrina-LevelFloods, supranote 395.
415

Id.

Id. (quoting Jeffrey Mount, University -of California, at annual conference of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science).
417 See Richmond, supra note 403, at 565-73.
418
Id. at 573-75, 579.
419 Id. at 579 (quoting National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders report). The
report suggested:
416

[M]ost new employment opportunities ... are being created in suburbs and
outlying areas-and this trend is likely to continue indefinitely.... The exclusion of blacks from this emerging suburban work force would become "the
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sprawl may lead to a decline in community welfare and individual
happiness. 420 These subjective claims are bolstered by objective data
indicating that sprawl-induced traffic congestion may cost Americans
$72 billion annually in lost time and fuel,421 and over two hundred
lives annually that are lost to road rage.4 22 Popular support for anti-

sprawl measures also suggests widespread dissatisfaction with sprawl423
ing development.
2. Defending Sprawl Regulations
Among the measures taken by local governments today to curb
sprawl, zoning regulations are perhaps the most common. For example, in response to the trend toward the "supersizing" of houses, some
municipalities have amended their zoning ordinances to set maximum limits on square footage or lot coverage. 42 4 Zoning has also been
used as a weapon against the proliferation of "big box" stores, with
their perceived ability to sap traditional downtowns of their economic
vitality.425 The legitimacy of zoning is well established, and challenges
426
to sprawl-preventing restrictions have been largely unsuccessful.
single most important source of poverty among Negroes" and a principle
source of family and social disorganization.
Id. (quoting National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders report).
420See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 398, at 876 (describing a report sponsored by Bank of
America, the California Resources Agency, Greenbelt Alliance, and the Low Income Fund
that concluded that "unchecked sprawl has shifted from an engine of California's growth
to a force that now threatens to inhibit growth and degrade the quality of our life"); Letter
to the Editor, Baby Boomer's "Wasteful" Sprawls, USA TODAY, June 4, 2002, at A12 (claiming
that "[u]nchecked sprawl has worsened environmental conditions, has bred a wasteland of
mega-marts and malls and, frankly, has diminished the quality of life"). See generally Dana,
supra note 307.
42 Dowling, supra note 398, at 875 (citing report by Texas Transportation Institute,
which found that Washington, D.C. residents waste about seventy-six hours each year in
traffic jams at a cost of about $1260 per person).
422 Id. (citing 1996 data reported by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety).
423 Id. at 877 (noting that voters in 1998 approved over seventy percent of the 240
sprawl-control ballot initiatives nationwide, and reporting comments in support of smart
growth and open space protection by thirty-four governors in 1998 inaugural remarks or
state of the state" speeches).
424 See Tom Kenworthy, Oversize Homes Wear Out Welcome, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2006, avail(describing
able at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-20-large-homes-x.htm
Aspen, Colorado ban on homes exceeding 15,000 square feet, and Arlington County, Virginia's limitation of building footprint to thirty percent of lot).
425 SeeJanet E. Milne, Symposium, Foreword: The Big Box Challenge, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1,
1 (2005).
426
See generally William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis
Citique, 35 WArE FOREST L. REv. 509 (2000); Dowling, supra note 398; Robert H. Freilich,
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As early as 1926, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of
local communities to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances. 4 7 Ironically, traditional zoning fostered the very type of low-density, useseparating, sprawling development that modern regulations now seek
to prevent. For example, in 1974, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the
Court upheld in poetic terms the government's discretion to promote
the kind of development that some today might criticize as sprawl:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs.... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is
ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a
42 8
sanctuary for people.
Later, zoning ordinances would be used by some communities to limit
undesirable sprawling development. 429 Almost thirty years ago, the
Court specifically endorsed sprawl prevention as a valid objective of
zoning. In 1980, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court upheld the government's authority to address "air, noise and water pollution, traffic
congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology
and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and
43 0
other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl."

Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation:A Unified Theory for PartialTakings Analysis, 24
U. HAW. L. REv. 589 (2002); James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits
on Government Powers: Effecting Nature, Markets and the Quality of Life Under the Takings and
Other Provisions, 9 DIcK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 421 (2001); Lora A. Lucero & Harrison T.
Higgins, Citizens Taking Matters into Their Own Hands, 37 URB. LAw. 607 (2005); Chris J.
Williams, Commentary, Do Smart Growth Policies Invite Regulatory Takings Challenges?A Survey
of Smart Growth and Regulatory Takings in the Southeastern United States, 55 ALA. L. REv. 895
(2004). But see generally Richmond, supra note 403.
427 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926) (upholding local
zoning ordinance as valid exercise of authority and rejecting facial attack).
428 Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding village's goals as permissible exercise of police power).
429 See Kenworthy, supra note 424; Milne, supra note 425, at 1.
430 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 n.8 (1980) (asserting that it has "long
...
been recognized as legitimate" for local governments to regulate "the 'premature and
unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban uses'"), abrogated on other grounds by
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306, 331-32 (2002) (holding that moratorium on development imposed during the process of revising a comprehensive land-use
plan does not constitute a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
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Following the lead of the Supreme Court, many lower courts
have upheld sprawl-control measures against challenges brought under the Fifth Amendment and under a variety of other constitutional
theories. 431 In cases where the government has prevailed, courts generally emphasize the nuisance-like aspects of sprawl, concluding that
the government has ample authority to pursue its prevention. 432 In
cases decided before the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,43 3 this type of analysis is particularly pronounced,
with some courts conflating the issues of whether a particular ordinance is a valid exercise of governmental authority, and whether the
exercise of such authority constitutes a regulatory taking. 434 After
Lingle, courts have continued to support the validity of sprawl-control
measures. 435 In a closely watched California case, for example, the
City of Turlock adopted a zoning ordinance clearly aimed at preventing the development of a Wal-Mart store. 436 In rejecting Wal-Mart's
431 See infra notes 433-437 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 433-437 and accompanying text.
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540; see supra notes 230-234 and accompanying text.
434 See, e.g., Loretto Dev. Co. v. Viii. of Chardon, Nos. 97-3502, 97-3656, 1998 WL
320981, at *4 (6th Cir.June 4, 1998) (rejecting takings challenge to denial of landowner's
proposal to rezone property to permit construction of Wal-Mart store); Dodd v. Hood
River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting takings challenge to zoning ordinance preventing landowners from building home in forest use zone, and citing
with approval governmental interest in protecting commercial timber practices against the
adverse consequences of sprawl); Windward Marina, L.L.C. v. City of Destin, 743 So. 2d
635, 639-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting takings challenge to denial of permit to
construct dry-dock marina, and evaluating resultant increased boat traffic in context of
nuisance law).
4s5 See, e.g., Peste v. Mason County, 136 P.3d 140, 144, 150 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting takings challenge to denial of rezoning petition to allow increased residential density, and noting with approval county's goal of reducing sprawl), review denied, 154 P.3d 919
(Wash. 2007).
436 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d-420, 421-22 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (rejecting police power and state law challenges to zoning ordinance). The
challenged zoning provision 'would limit the ability of 'big box' retailers to sell nontaxable
items such as groceries." Id. at 423. Wal-Mart, Inc. v. City of Turlock was disapproved of on
other grounds by Hernandez v. City of Hanford, 159 P.3d 33, 43-45 (Cal. 2007) In Hernandez
the court disapproved any language in Wal-Mart that may be interpreted as inconsistent
with the view that:
432

433

even when the regulation of economic competition reasonably can be viewed as a
direct and intended effect of a zoning ordinance or action, so long as the primary
purpose ... is not the impermissable private anticompetitive goal of protecting or
disadvantaging a particular favored or disfavored business or individual ... the
ordinance reasonably relates to the general welfare of the municipality and constitotes a legitimate exercise of the municipality's police power.
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challenge to the ordinance, the court noted with approval the legislative purposes of "protect[ing] against urban/suburban decay, increased traffic, and reduced air quality, all of which, according to. the
43 7
City, can result from the development of discount superstores."
3. Sprawl Protection as Offensive Claim
A public way is obstructedjust as effectively by a pattern of low-density development that over time generates more auto trips than roads can handle,
as by an ox cart abandoned in the middle of a road.
438
-Henry R. Richmond

Sprawl presents a more tenuous case for nuisance than does wetland destruction. Unlike the latter-which may even support an affirmative action for nuisance abatement-in the case of sprawl it may
be difficult to trace causation and to prove sufficient injury for standing.439 As one commentator has noted, "[traditional] nuisances hur-

led directly and immediately across property lines and substantially
harmed a clearly identifiable, usually adjacent, rural landowner and
perhaps a few others." 440 In contrast, this commentator notes that "a
subdivision or shopping mall at the metropolitan fringe affects people
in the interior from a considerable distance, in an indirect manner
...

and affects many people a little instead of one or a few people a

great deal." 441 Even if these problems of injury and causation can be
overcome, the very pervasiveness of zoning regulations poses hurdles
to the affirmative nuisance suit. 442 Otherwise viable common law actions may be preempted by complementary legislative efforts to curb
sprawl. 443

437 Wal-Mart, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 439. See generally In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397
(Vt. 1997) (upholding Vermont's Act 250).
438 Richmond, supra note 403, at 577 (arguing that "[p]ublic health is threatened just
as much by airborne emissions from millions of tailpipes as by the airborne germs from
rotting hog carcasses or a malarial pond").
439 See id. at 577-78.
440Id. at 577.

441 Id.
442 Id. at 577-78.

44 Richmond, supra note 403, at 578 n.121 (arguing that the "apparently slam-dunk
nuisance lawsuit is not viable because state legislatures have supplanted common-law nuisance principles with sprawl zoning. The argument would have to be that because 1920s
style zoning does not attempt to assess the metro-wide impacts of many modern land uses,
zoning statutes do not pre-empt nuisance claims").
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C. Global Warming as New Nuisance
While the Congress that drafted sec.202(a)(1) [of the Clean Air Act] might
not have appreciated the possibility that burningfossil fuels could lead to
global warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility,
changing circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the
Clean Air Act obsolete.
-Justice John Paul Stevens 4 4
1. The New Learningon Global Warming

As the composition of the earth's atmosphere changes, more of
the sun's energy is trapped rather than radiated back into space. 445
This change is brought about by the emission of so-called "greenhouse gases," including carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, hy446
drofluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride, and perfluorocarbons.
About seventy-five percent of the carbon dioxide emitted by humans
during the past two decades can be attributed to the burning of fossil
fuels (primarily by automobiles and power plants), with additional
447
emissions attributable to deforestation and other land use changes.
Perhaps the best scientific consensus on climate change (including global warming) is provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (the "IPCC"), established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. 448 The IPCC has issued a series of "assessment reports," including Climate Change 2001449 and Climate Change 2007.450 Although
the human causes of global warming are subject to a measure of dis444Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).
445 See Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change Science, http://epa.gov/
climatechange/science/index.hmiI (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
446 Id. The first three greenhouse gases occur both naturally and as byproducts of human activities, whereas the remaining three gases are not naturally occurring. Id.
447 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE
SCIENTIFIC BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS].
44 United Nations Env't Programme & World Meteorological Org., Intergovernmental
Panel On Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
449See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THIRD ASSESSMENT
REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001 (2001), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htn
(last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
451 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESS-

2007 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch (last visited
Oct. 4,2007). The report incorporates four components: The Physical Science Basis, Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability, Mitigation of Climate Change and a Synthesis Report. Id.
MENT REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE
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pute, they have been identified with an increasing degree of confidence over time. 451 In 2001, the IPCC asserted that although natural
factors have made "small contributions" to global warming, "concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases and their radiative forcing
have continued to increase as a result of human activities." 452 In response to a 2001 request from the White House, the National Research Council agreed that the increase in surface air temperatures
and subsurface ocean temperatures over the past several decades "are
likely mostly due to human activities," but added, "we cannot rule out
that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of natural variability."453 The IPCC's subsequent report, Climate Change 2007,
concluded, "The understanding of anthropogenic warming and cooling influences on climate has improved since the [2001 Assessment
Report], leading to very high confidence that the global average net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.. ... 454
The IPCC added that the rate of increase of radiative forcing during
the industrial era "due to increases in carbon dioxide, methane, and
nitrous oxide ...

is very likely to have been unprecedented in more

than 10,000 years." 45 5 The IPCC predicts a variety of climate changes
and consequences by the end of the twenty-first century, including an
average surface temperature increase of 1.8 to 4.0 degrees centigrade,
and a rise of global mean sea level of 0.18 to 0.59 meters.456 Moreover,

451 See infra notes 452-457 and accompanying text.
452 CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS,

supra note 447, at 7, 9. The IPCC
defines "radiative forcing" as "a measure of the influence a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earth-atmosphere system, and [as] an index
of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change mechanism"). Id. at 5 n.8.
The IPCC further asserted in its 2001 report that "[t) here is new and stronger evidence
that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities." Id. at 10.
453 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY

QUESTIONS 1 (2001). The National Research Council, part of the National Academy of
Sciences, was organized in 1916 primarily to advise the federal government on scientific
and technical matters. Id. at vii. This 2001 analysis was a response to a request from the
White House for "assistance in identifying the areas in the science of climate change where
there are the greatest certainties and uncertainties" and "views on whether there are any
substantive differences between IPCC Reports and the IPCC summaries." Id.
454 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (2007), available at http://www.
ipcc.ch.
455 Id.
456 Id. at 13 (predicting changes for years 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999).
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the IPCC projects that increases in tropical cyclone (typhoon and
457
hurricane) wind and precipitation intensities are "likely."
2. Defending Climate Regulations
As discussed above, wetland destruction and land use patterns
are regulated by well-developed legislative schemes under the Clean
Water Act and local zoning ordinances, respectively.458 Those seeking
to avoid such regulation have claimed, inter alia, that it constitutes a
regulatory taking for which compensation is required-a claim that
may be refuted in some cases by a new nuisance defense. 459 Surprisingly, this same pattern has not appeared in the context of global
warming regulation. 460 That is, opponents of new laws aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions have not challenged them under the
Fifth Amendment regulatory takings doctrine, at least not yet. 46 1
The most obvious explanation for this absence of takings litigation is quite simple: there is little or no legislation in existence to
serve as the target of a challenge, either at the federal or state levels.
In fact, at the federal level, it is those who favor regulation-and not
property rights advocates opposing it-who have filed suit. For example, in the 2007 Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. Environmental
457Id. at 15; see also P.J.
Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration,and
Intensity in a WarmingEnvironment,309 SCIENCE 1844, 1846 (2005) (concluding that "global
data indicate a 30-year trend toward more frequent and intense hurricanes"). Webster et
al. explain that:

[t]
his trend is not inconsistent with recent climate model simulations that a
doubling of CO may increase the frequency of the most intense cyclones, although attribution of the 30-year trends to global warming would require a
longer global data record and, especially, a deeper understanding of the role
of hurricanes in the general circulation of the atmosphere and ocean ....
Id.; Dean Scott, Researchers' Models Suggest Stronger Link Between Greenhouse Emissions, Hurricanes, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., Sept. 12, 2006, at A-1 (identifying "human-induced factors as
the single most important contributor to changes in sea surface temperatures") (citing
Tom Wigley, coauthor of study, B.D Santer, Forced and Unforced Ocean Temperature Changes in
Atlantic and Pacific Tropical Cyclogenesis Regions, PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI., Sept. 11, 2006).
458 See supra notes 334-387, 424-437 and accompanying text.
45 See supra notes 334-387, 424-437 and accompanying text.
460See generallyJusTiN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS: AN OvERVIEw or
(2006 & Mar. 5, 2007 Supp.), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/global-warmingjitigation/global (describing pending lawsuits); Community Rights Counsel, Legal Resources, Global
Warming Litigation-Clean Air Act, Nuisance, Preemption and Other Cases (April 2007),
http://www.communityrights.org/legalresources/PetitionsForCertiorari/GWC%20and%2
OMaterials.asp (listing global warming cases).
46 See generally PIDdT, supra note 460; Community Rights Counsel, supra note 460.
CURRENT LITIGATION AND COMMON LEGAL ISSUES
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Protection Agency the issue was whether the states and others could
compel the federal government to regulate greenhouse gases, not
whether any such regulation would run afoul of the takings doctrine. 462 Thus, it may be simply too soon for takings litigation to have
materialized, particularly "as-applied" rather than "facial" challenges.
A second plausible explanation is that opponents of climate
change regulation have relied upon nonjudicial challenges 463 or upon
legal theories not premised upon Fifth Amendment regulatory takings. 46 4 This hypothesis may be supported by industry's reaction to Cali-

fornia's pioneering efforts to regulate greenhouse gases. 465 For example, in 2006, in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, a case
before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California,
automobile manufacturers challenged California's 2004 adoption of
vehicle emission regulations for greenhouse gases, claiming that the
state's action had been preempted by various federal statutes and that
the new emission standards would usurp the authority of the Federal
Department of Transportation ("DOT") to regulate fuel economy.466 A
S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007); see infra notes 477-481 and accompanying text.
463 Despite signs that industry is increasingly receptive to climate change legislation, see
infra notes 523-536 and accompanying text, evidence exists that some in industry and
government continue to challenge the basis for such legislation, or even to manipulate the
underlying data. See Steven D. Cook, Council on Environmental Quality Questioned on Alleged
Twisting of Global Warming Data, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., July 21, 2006, at A-3 (describing
investigation by House Government Reform Committee of "alleged manipulation of scientific data by [Council on Environmental Quality] staff to minimize the reported impact of
global warming"); Ian Sample, Scientists Offered Cash to Dispute Climate Study, GUARDIAN
(London), Feb. 2, 2007, at 1 (alleging that "[s] cientists and economists have been offered
$10,000 each by a lobby group funded by one of the world's largest oil companies to undermine a major climate change report due to be published today [the IPCC's Climate
Change 20071 "); Scientists'ReportDocuments ExxonMobil's Tobacco-Like DisinformationCampaign
on Global Warming Science: Oil Company Spent Nearly $16 Million to Fund Skeptic Groups, Create
462 127

Confision, UNION

CONCERNED

SCIENTISTS, Jan. 3,

2007, http://www.ucsusa.org/news/

press-release/ExxonMobil-GlobalWarming-tobacco.htnL (asserting that "ExxonMobil has
funneled nearly $16 million between 1998 and 2005 to a network of 43 advocacy organizations that seek to confuse the public on global warming science").
46 See generaly PIDOT, supra note 460; Community Rights Counsel, supra note 460.
465 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (2007) (requiring the California Air
Resources Board to "develop and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum feasible
and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles"). Congress
has delegated unique authority to California to enact motor vehicle emission standards,
subject to certain federal approvals. See Clean Air Act, § 209(b) 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)

(2000).
46 456 F. Supp 2d 1160, 1165-66 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (denying state defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim). On January 16, 2007, the district court found California's program to regulate greenhouse gases to be preempted and enjoined its enforcement pending a waiver of federal preemption from the U.S. EPA. See Cent. Valley ChryslerJeep v. Witherspoon, No. CVF 04-6663 AWI LJO, 2007 WL 135688, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
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similar group of plaintiffs challenged the adoption of emissions standards by Vermont and Rhode Island. 467 This argument has been un-

dermined considerably, however, by the U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Massachusetts468 and the district court's resolution of
the Vermont case where the court held that the state regulations,
adopted under the Clean Air Act, are not-preempted by the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act. 469
A third potential explanation is that regulation of the air-as opposed to regulation of wetlands and land use-does not lend itself to
legal challenges grounded in the takings doctrine. Nevertheless- although the regulation of air pollutants differs conceptually from the
regulation of wetlands filling or other uses of real property-there is
at least limited precedent for challenging air pollution regulation as a
470
regulatory taking.
A fourth possible explanation is that regulatory takings challenges
will never pose a significant hurdle to global warming legislation. That
is, as the science on climate change develops, it may become easier to
prove that greenhouse gas pollution unleashes nuisance-like harms
16, 2007). The court stayed further proceedings pending the Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts. See id. Beyond the vehicle emission standards, California also enacted
groundbreaking statewide emission caps for stationary sources through the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. See CAL. Hr.ALT & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (2006) (requiring state air resources board to adopt regulations reducing emissions to 1990 levels by
2020).
467 See generally Green Mountain Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep v. Crombie, No. 2:05cv-302, 2:05-cv-304 238-39, 2007 WL 2669444, at *91-93 (D. Vt. Sept. 12, 2007) (holding
that Vermont's auto emissions standards for greenhouse gases are not preempted by the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act); Complaint, Lincoln Dodge Inc. v. Sullivan, No.
CV0670T (D. R.I. Feb. 13, 2006) (challenging Rhode Island's greenhouse gas emissions
standards for automobiles). Under the Clean Air Act, California may adopt its own vehicle
emissions standards, so long as the state is granted a preemption waiver by EPA and other
states may adopt a California standard for which a waiver has been granted. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7507, 7543(a), (b) (2000). To date, the California greenhouse gas emissions standards
have been adopted by Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See Tony Perriello &
Carolyn Whetzel, Court Backs Vermont Emissions Rules Against Challenge Brought by Auto Industry, 38 BNA ENV'T REp. 1954, 1954 (2007).
468 See Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1461-62, 1463 (holding that the U.S. EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act and rejecting the
EPA's argument that such regulation would interfere with DOT's authority to set fuel efficiency standards for automobiles); see also infta notes 477-481 and accompanying text.
4 Green Mountain, 2007 WL 2669444, at *91-93.
470 See, e.g., D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 393 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
takings challenge by restaurant and bar owners to city ordinance restricting smoking in
enclosed public places). Although plaintiffs failed on the merits, the case suggests no theoretical bar to the challenge of air regulation as regulatory taking. See id.
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As a result, potential plaintiffs must weigh the possibil-

ity that their contemplated takings challenges will fail under the increasingly powerful new nuisance affirmative defense available to gov472
ernment regulators.
3. Climate Protection as an Offensive Claim

Climate protection advocates have filed a series of lawsuits affirmatively challenging atmospheric pollution. 473 Although plaintiffs face
numerous procedural and substantive hurdles, they are gaining traction in the courts and have prevailed on preliminary issues such as
standing. 474 Although the likelihood of success is still small-particularly in the nuisance lawsuits-the stakes are enormous. As one
practitioner notes, "The prospect of liability is a serious matter... Even
if the risk appears to be small in terms of the likelihood of being found
liable, the consequences of being held liable are substantial-po" 475
tentially in the trillions of dollars.
Four cases are particularly noteworthy. 476 The first contemplated
whether carbon dioxide qualifies as an air pollutant under the Clean
Air Act. 477 In Massachusetts, twelve states and other plaintiffs brought

an action challenging the EPA's denial of a petition under section
202 (a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, seeking the regulation of carbon diox478
ide and other greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.
In April 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the peti-

supra notes 445-457 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 259-275 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 476-502 and accompanying text.
474 See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458 (holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge EPA's failure to regulate greenhouse gases from automobiles).
47 Kristin Choo, Feeling the Heat: The Growing Debate over Climate Change Takes on Legal
Overtones, 2006 A.B.A. J. 29, 34 (quoting John C. Dernbach, cochair, Sustainable Development, Ecosystems and Climate Change Committee, ABA Section of Environment, Energy
and Resources). Dernbach's observations are reminiscent ofJudge Learned Hand's articulation of the so-called "CarrollTowing Formula," under which a defendant's duty in tort is a
function of three variables: the probability of harm, the gravity of harm, and the burden of
adequate precautions. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (holding barge company liable in negligence for damage occurring when barge
broke away from its mooring during daylight hours and no attendant was aboard the ship).
Extrapolating broadly to the context of global warming, the greater the body of evidence
that catastrophic climate change is likely to occur, the more reasonable it becomes to impose liability upon atmospheric polluters. See id.
476 See infra notes 477-502 and accompanying text.
477 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1460.
478
Id. at 1446.
471 See
472
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tioners had standing, 479 that the EPA has statutory authority under the
Clean Air Act to regulate as "air pollutants" greenhouse gases emitted
by motor vehicles, 48° and that the EPA's charge to protect the public
health and welfare is a "statutory obligation wholly independent of
DOT's mandate to promote energy efficiency."481 The Court's opinion
began with a review of the advances in climate change science during
the last fifty years, citing studies conducted by the U.S. government
and the IPCC.482 Whereas the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit-which held that the EPA properly exercised its discretion in denying the rulemaking petition-relied heavily on a 2001
statement by the National Research Council that "'a causal linkage'
between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming 'cannot be
unequivocally established,'" 48 the Supreme Court viewed that statement as a "residual uncertainty" 484 and noted that the "NRC Report
... identifies a number of environmental changes that have already

inflicted significant harms, including the 'global retreat of mountain
glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of
rivers and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels
.
'...,"48
The Court relied on this new learning in holding that the
EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean
Air Act, emphasizing that "changing circumstances and scientific developments" must be taken into account.4 m
At least three other global warming lawsuits are of particular interest. 487 First, because the appellants in Massachusetts had been un-

successful before the D.C. Circuit in forcing the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, while their appeal was pending before the
Supreme Court, an alliance including many of the same states and
environmental organizations brought an offensive nuisance claim as
an alternative avenue of relief.488 In 2005, in Connecticut v. American
479Id. at 1458.

4w Id. at 1463.
481 Id. at 1462.
482 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1447-49.
483Massachusetts v. Envd. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 453, at 17), rev'd, 127 S.Ct. 1438.
4
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
453, at 16).
48 Id. at 1455.
486Id. at 1462.
487See infra notes 488-502 and accompanying text.
488 See generally Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y
2005) (dismissing action as nonjusticiable political question), appeal docketed, No. 05-5104
(2d Cir. Sept. 22, 2005).
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Electric Power Co., a case filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the plaintiffs again sought to abate global
warming, this time terming it a public nuisance. 489 The plaintiffs targeted five public utility companies as defendants, alleging that together they emit one fourth of the U.S. electric power sector's carbon
dioxide emissions, and therefore contribute significantly to climate
change. 490 The plaintiffs sought a complicated remedy, asking the
court to set a cap on each defendants' carbon dioxide emissions, as
well as an emission reduction schedule. 491 The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that addressing climate
change as a public nuisance-at least in the manner requested by the
plaintiffs-was a nonjusticiable political question. 492 Nevertheless, the
court provided instructive language suggesting weaknesses that future
environmental plaintiffs might overcome to prosecute successful nuisance actions-indicating that the relief sought was overbroad and
493
revealed the "transcendently legislative nature of [the] litigation."
Two other cases are more promising for an ultimate recognition
of climate change as public nuisance, ruling in favor of environmental
plaintiffs on the standing-related issues of injury-in-fact, causation,
and redressability. 494 In 2005, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, a
489 Id. at 267. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30
COLUM.J. ENVT'L L. 293 (2005) (doubting success of claim).
4
9 Am. Elec. Power,406 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
491 Id. at 270. This request would have required defendants to comply with emissions
caps that parallel the Kyoto Protocol, which the United States did not ratify. Id. at 269-70.
492
Id. at 271-74.
493 Id. at 272. (explaining that the requested relief would require the court to make a
number of policy determinations "of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"); see alsd id.
at 270 (describing prayer for court to "enjoin[] each of the Defendants to abate its contribution to the nuisance by capping its emissions of carbon dioxide and then reducing those
emissions by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade"). But see California v.
Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-CV-05755, slip op. at 23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing
public nuisance claim against manufacturer of motor vehicles as a nonjusticiable political
question); In re: Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d
291, 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y 2006) (denying defendant gasoline producers' motion to dismiss
on basis of political question doctrine, and distinguishing Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co. as a case in which plaintiffs sought quasi-legislative relief when Congress and the
Executive had specifically refused to act); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434
F. Supp. 2d 957, 970 (D. Or. 2006) (distinguishing American Electric Power Co. as a case
where the court was asked "to make a free-wheeling policy choice and decide whether
global warming is, or is not, a serious threat or what measures should be taken to remedy
that problem"). For another nuisance-based lawsuit, see generally Comer v. Murphy Oil,
U.S.A., No. 1:05-CV-00436 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing nuisance claim against oil
and gas companies which alleged that their greenhouse gas emissions exacerbated the
damage caused by Hurricane Katrina).
494 See infra notes 495-502 and accompanying text.
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case before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, plaintiff environmental organizations alleged that defendants
had provided assistance to particular projects that contribute to climate change without complying with the National Environmental Policy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.495 The court found that
plaintiffs had standing, noting that a more lenient standard should be
applied in cases alleging procedural statutory violations. 496 Moreover,

in a later phase of the litigation, the court indicated its willingness to
49 7
accept a link between human activity and climate change.
Similarly, in 2006, in Northwest Environmental Defense Center v.
Owens Corning Corp., the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge alleged violations of the
Clean Air Act that could promote global warming. 498 The court found
that the plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated causation, even
though they relied upon indirect links between cause and effect. 499 In
495 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 024106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment). Defendants are Peter Watson, Chief Executive Officer of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Peter Merrill, Vice Chairman and First Vice President of the ExportImport Bank of the United States (Ex-Im). Id. As the court explained, "OPIC, an independent government corporation, offers insurance and loan guarantees for projects in
developing countries.... Ex-Im, an independent governmental agency and wholly-owned
government corporation, provides financing support for exports from the United States."
Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2197(a) (2000)).
496 See id. at *2 ("When, as here, a plaintiff seeks to challenge a procedural violation,
some uncertainty about redressability and causality is allowed."); see also id. at *3 ("Here,
any concern that Plaintiffs' asserted injuries are caused by third parties must be evaluated
in light of lower threshold for causation in procedural injury cases.").
497 See Scott Lindlaw, FederalJudge Allows Global Warming Lawsuit to Advance, SSGNoNSANDIEGO.COM, Mar. 31, 2007, http://signonsandiego.com. Citing to the Al Gore documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, and to other sources, the court stated, "It would be difficult
for the court to conclude that defendants have created a genuine dispute that [greenhouse gases] do not contribute to global warming." Id.
498 Owens Coming., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (upholding standing in action alleging violations of Clean Air Act § 165(a)). After the court rejected defendant Owens Corning's motion to dismiss, the parties reached a settlement agreement. See generally Stipulated Order
of Dismissal, Owens Corning, 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (No. 04-CV-172-JE); Pac. Envtl. Advocacy
Ctr., Court Rules Against Owens Corning Corporation, http://law.lclark.edu/org/peac/
latest.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
499 Owens Coming, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 967-68. The court noted:
Other forecasted impacts from [Defendant's] ... emissions would operate
less directly. For instance, ozone-depleting emissions from Defendant's facility
must first ascend to the stratosphere before impacting persons on the ground
in Oregon. Global warming likewise operates indirectly. Higher sea levels in
Oregon will supposedly result from melting ice in the earth's polar regions.... Nevertheless, the adverse effects alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint
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declining to adopt a narrow view of standing, the court rejected the
notion-derived from the special injury rule of public nuisance-that
"injury to all is injury to none."500 Under that view, the court explained that "if the proposed action threatened the very survival of
our species, no person would have standing to contest it. The greater
the threatened harm, the less power the courts would have to intercede. That is an illogical proposition." 50 1 Massachusetts reinforced this
view of the injury element of standing in the context of climate
change, as the Supreme Court stated "[t]hat these climate-change
risks are widely shared does not minimize Massachusetts' interest in
50 2
the outcome of this litigation."
4. New Learning on Global Warming as Legislative Catalyst
When the potential threat of climate change first came to national attention, many in government and industry responded with
denial.50 s International efforts to draft and ratify the Kyoto Protocol
(the "Protocol") highlight this opposition in the United States to aggressive regulation. 50 4 The Clinton administration ultimately agreed,
through the Protocol, to reduce U.S. emissions seven percent below
1990 levels, to be achieved by 2012.505 During its negotiations, how-

ever, the administration introduced several stumbling blocks that
would continue to be hallmarks of U.S. policy through successive administrations. 50 6 These hurdles included policy options. to reduce the
economic impact of compliance, as well as demanding that all nations
(both developed and developing) agree to the Protocol. 50 7 The

George W. Bush administration later rejected the treaty, citing scienwould be felt by them here in Oregon, and the source of Defendant's emissions would be in Oregon.
Id. at 965; see also id. at 968 (recognizing more lenient requirement of causation in context
of motion to dismiss for lack of standing than in context of merits of tort action).
5 Id. at 965-66.
501Id. at 966.
502Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 (internal quotation marks omitted).

505 See infra notes 504-514 and accompanying text.
504See infra notes 505-508 and accompanying text.
505 DONALD A. BROWN,

AMERICAN HAT:. ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED

STATES' RESPONSE To GLOBAL WARMING 30 (2002). The author had been "a former liaison
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to the United Nations from 1995 to 1998, a
member of several U.S. delegations to UN negotiations on environmental and development issues, and a long-time observer of the U.S. role in international environmental issues .... " Id. at xv.
506 Id. at 30.

507 Id.
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tific uncertainty, as well as the factors advanced by the Clinton administration.5 08 For its part, the Senate refused to ratify the Protocol. 5 9 A prominent senator stated, for example, "Any way you measure this, this is a bad deal for America."5 10 Similarly, another senator
would later denounce the threat of catastrophic global warming as
"the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people."5 11 Industry, too, mounted an attack on the Protocol, airing commercials
that "showed a scissors cutting those countries out of a world map that
would not have enforceable emissions targets... [thereby suggesting]
that a Kyoto treaty would unfairly exempt these nations."512 Several
years later, industry would engage in another memorable television
advertising campaign, this time in response to the movie, An Inconvenient Truth.513 Showing an attractive, pigtailed young girl blowing onto
a dandelion stalk to scatter its seeds, the narrator states, "[carbon dioxide] is essential to life [because] we breathe it out." The narrator
concludes, referring to carbon dioxide, "They call it pollution. We call
it life." 514 '
Over time, there has been an evolution in the attitudes of political and industrial leaders about the seriousness of the threat posed by
global warming.5 15 Some have called for governmental measures to
encourage voluntary efforts to protect the global atmosphere. 516 For
example, in 2005, Senator Chuck Hagel-a staunch opponent of the
Kyoto Protocol-introduced three legislative bills to spur the devel508

Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 31.
510 BROWN, supra note 505, at 37 (quoting Sen. Chuck Hagel).
51 149 CONG. REc. 19913, 19943 (2003) (statement of Sen.James Inhofe).
512 BROWN, supra note 505, at 33 (describing "an industry coalition of oil companies,
electric utilities, automobile manufacturers, and farm groups [that] launched a multimillion-dollar advertising campaign to generate public opposition to a Kyoto treaty").
513 See Competitive Enter. Inst., We Call It Life, http://strearns.cei.org (last visited Sept.
23, 2007) (showing clip of "Energy," a "60-second television spot[] [aired from May 18 to
May 28, 2006] focusing on the alleged global warming crisis and the calls by some environmental groups and politicians for reduced energy use"). In a similar vein, global warming skeptic and British filmmaker Mark Durkin sought to cast doubt on the role of human
emissions in causing climate change in his video, The Great Global Warming Swindle. See
Raphael G. Satter, Scientists Demand Changes to Film by Global Warming Skeptic ENVTL. NEWS
NETWORK, Apr. 26, 2007, available at http://www.enn.com/top-stories/article/6461. British scientists noted that the video contains a "long catalog of fundamental and profound
mistakes." Id. (quoting Bob Ward, former spokesman for the Royal Society, Britain's academy of science, and describing critical letter written by "38 scientists, including the former
heads of Britain's academy of sciences and Britain's weather office").
14 See Competitive Enter. Inst., supra note 513.
515 See infra notes 516-527 and accompanying text.
516 See infra notes 517-522 and accompanying text.
509
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opment of clean-energy technologies. 517 He stopped well short of endorsing mandatory emission caps, however, relying instead upon vol518
untary public-private partnerships and upon incentives to industry.
Similarly, commenting on the release of Climate Change 2007,519 the
Bush administration embraced the report, but indicated that it would
continue to rely primarily upon voluntary methods to address the
problem. 520 Also promoting voluntary efforts, Wal-Mart launched a
broad sustainability campaign in 2006.521 Among other things, the effort seeks to double the efficiency of its vehicle fleet in ten years, and
522
to reduce the energy use in its stores by thirty percent.
Others have gone even further, seeking mandatory federal regulation of atmospheric pollution contributing to climate change. 523 For
example, some politicians have called for the prompt enactment of
mandatory caps on U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. 524 Increasingly,
industry has supported such calls. 525 In a move that would have been
largely unthinkable just a decade ago, a coalition of prominent businesses and environmental groups-the U.S. Climate Action Partner517 See Amanda Griscom Little, The Chuck Stops Here: An Interview with Senator Chuck Hagel,
Republican from Nebraska, on His New Climate Bills, GRIST, Mar. 1, 2005, http://www.grist.
org/news/maindish/2005/03/01/hagel. With respect to his position on climate change
treaties, the Senator asserted:

My position has been very consistent. In 1997, I introduced the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, and if you read that it says two things: the Senate would not ratify
any climate-change treaty that does not include developing nations and does
harm to the U.S. economy. So I'm right where I was in 1997, and that's reflected in the legislation that I introduced. I've always said that climate
change is a cycle of the world. We've always had extreme swings in climate,
long before there was a combustion engine or a great population of human
beings in the world.
Id.
518 See id.
519 See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
520 See Dean Scott & Larry Speer, Bush Administration Embraces )PCC Findings but Resists
Callfor Capping U.S. Emissions, 38 BNA ENV'T REP. 301, 301 (2007).
521 See Marc Gunther, The Green Machine, FORTUNE, July 31, 2006, available at http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2006/08/07/8382593/index.htm.
522 Id.
523 See infra ntoes 524-527 and accompanying text.
524 Dean Scott, Senators Say ConsensusBuildingfor Bill with Mandatory Caps on Greenhouse
Gases, 38 BNA ENV'T REP. (2007); Dean Scott, Pelosi Says House Will Not Wait for Bush, Will
Pass "Groundbreaking"Legislation, 38 BNA ENV'T REP. 174, 174 (2007); see also Climate
Chang CongressionalResearch Service Comparison of Key Provisions of Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Bills Introduced in 110th Congress, BNA DAILY ENV'T REp., Feb. 2, 2007, at E-1 (describing
four congressional proposals introduced in the 110th Congress that would set an absolute
cap on specified greenhouse gas emissions).
525 See infranotes 526-527 and accompanying text.
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ship-recently called on the federal government to "quickly enact
strong national legislation to require significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. "526 This alliance includes an impressive roster of
powerful corporations, including Alcoa, British Petroleum America,
Catepillar, Inc., Duke Energy, DuPont, General Electric, Lehman
527
Brothers, and PG&E.

Undoubtedly, a constellation of factors has prompted what appears
to be a growing acceptance of mandatory climate legislation. 528 In some
instances, corporations may be engaged in strategic gamesmanship,
529
opposing state legislation in the name of federal preemption now,
and perhaps opposing federal legislation under alternative theories
later. In other cases, businesses may view federal legislation as inevitable, and seek to position themselves as participants in the development
of such legislation. 53 0 Still others may seek profitable opportunities
available to climate change leaders. 531 And some may even be moti532
vated by a sense of duty and moral obligation.
526

See United States Climate Action Partnership, http://www.us-cap.org (last visited

Oct. 5, 2007).
527 Id. Environmental partners include Environmental Defense, Natural Resources Defense Council, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, and the World Resources Institute.
Id.
528 See infra notes 529-536 and accompanying text.
529 See supra notes 465-469 and accompanying text.
530 See Dean Scott, Alcoa, Duke Energy, Others See Federal Curb on Greenhouse Gas Emissions
As Inevitable, BNA DAiLY ENV'T REP., Oct. 19, 2006, at A-i (discussing survey of thirty-one
multinational corporations in which sixty-seven percent predicted that federal greenhouse
gas regulations will be implemented between 2010 and 2015).
531 See id. (reporting that firms said they are "no longer focused solely on managing
the financial risks of climate change ... but are also finding new business opportunities in
cutting greenhouse gas emissions"); see also Tom Blass, British Report on Economics of Warming Prompts New Initiatives to Cut Emissions, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., Oct. 31, 2006, at A-4
(describing a U.K. government report entitled Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change which concludes that the costs of inaction outweigh the risks and that "markets for
low carbon energy products are likely to be worth at least $500 billion per year by 2050,
perhaps much more"); John Herzfeld, Goldman Sachs Sets Environmental Policy, Calls for Urgent Action on Greenhouse Gases, BNA DAILY ENV'T RP., Nov. 28, 2005, at A-4 (quoting
Goldman Sachs policy statement that the "government can help the markets ... by establishing a strong policy framework that creates long-term value for greenhouse gas emissions reductions and consistently supports and incentivizes the development of new technologies that lead to a less carbon-intensive economy"); Mark Rice-Oxley, Never Mind
Altruism: "Savingthe Earth" Can Mean Big Bucks: Some $1 Trillion in "Green" Business Opportunities Await Creative Entrepreneurs,a Report Finds, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONrrOR, Oct. 25, 2006, at
4, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1025/p4sOl-wogi.html.
532 See Bill Redeker, Evangelicals See an Evolution of Their Own: Movement Seen as Distancingfrom GOP, Homosexuality, Taking Up Global Warming, ABC NEWS, May 4, 2007, availableat
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=3138468&page=l (noting that eighty-six evangelical leaders recently issued an "Evangelical Call to Action" stating that there is "no
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Perhaps the dominant factor leading to greater acceptance of
global warming legislation is the new scientific learning about the
threats and causes of climate change-embodied in prominent reports
such as Climate Change 2001 and Climate Change 2007.533 As the knowledge base increases, society's reaction may change from that of environmental cynicism to that of appreciating environmental connectivity.53 4 As
a result, the new nuisance has evolved in the context of global warming.
Through offensive nuisance law suits, courts have increasingly been
asked to expand the conventional wisdom on cause and effect.53 5 As an
attorney from the Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute
has surmised, "successful common law nuisance suits can spur legislative action.... Today's global warming nuisance suits could have the
effect of encouraging Congress to adopt more comprehensive legislative solutions a few years from now."536
CONCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL PATRIOTISM AND THE THIRD
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council purported to establish a
new bright-line threshold of takings liability, triggered when regulation deprives landowners of all economically beneficial use. Ironically,
however, the new nuisance defense has proved to be more enduring
than the rule. As one commentator stated, what Justice Scalia "hoped
to serve as a per se takings rule proves, in its practical operation, to
work more often as a per se no takings rule."53 7 As a result of the new

rule and defense, courts have placed renewed emphasis on a broad
balancing of public and private interests. Drawing upon the long tradition of nuisance law, courts weigh factors as concrete as market
value and as ephemeral as happiness. 5 8 As an opinion from the U.S.
longer a debate about the dangers of global warming so the government should ... create
a federal law that would mandate lower carbon dioxide emissions").
533 See supra notes 445-457 and accompanying text.
534 See supra notes 85-111, 285-311 and accompanying text.
535 See supra notes 438-443 and accompanying text.
536 PIDOT, supra note 460, at 5 (observing that "a good deal of the modern federal environmental law adopted in the 1970s was enacted in response to rulings in common law
suits brought to redress environmental injuries").
537 See Lazarus, supra note 227, at 823-24.
538 See, e.g., Travis v. Moore, 377 So. 2d 609, 611 (Miss. 1979) (describing nuisance in
terms of impairment to neighborhood happiness, in context of undertaking establishments); San Diego v. Carlstrom, 16 Cal. Rptr. 667, 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (describing
nuisance in terms of "unnecessary and extreme danger to the life, property and happiness
of others"); 17 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 17, § 2802 (2006) (defining nuisance to include the
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated, courts
have returned to a "gestalt approach" that evaluates both the purpose
53 9
and desired effect of governmental regulation.
Perhaps the broader lesson from Lucas and its progeny is that the
public interest-and its supporting regulations-should not be circumscribed by a single measure as narrow as the economic impact of regulation on landowners' wallets. Rather, as recognized long ago by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York,
economic impact is but one factor that societies should consider in a
just and equitable distribution of the burdens of modern life. Courts
should identify all of the impacts of an action-in accordance with
changed circumstances and new learning-in determining whether
such action may be regulated without compensation in the name of the
public good. In this context, the reincorporation of nuisance into the
law of regulatory takings levels the playing field between public and
private interests. By examining cause-effect relationships, nuisance is
capable of defusing the modern one-sided rhetoric of rights that portrays landowners as the victims of government regulators, even when
those landowners generate negative externalities that adversely affect
their neighbors.
The legacy of Lucas may go far beyond the context of regulatory
takings litigation. More broadly, innovators are beginning to see
greater profit in fighting global warming than in fighting the government's regulation of greenhouse gases. The first and second industrial revolutions brought new technologies to England and the
United States, respectively,-including the "spinning Jenny," the "water frame," the steam engine, and the locomotive. 54° Some claim that
a "third industrial revolution" may now be underway, fueled by the
development of technological solutions to increasingly prominent
environmental challenges such as providing sustainable energy and
addressing global warming. 541 Banking on this entrepreneurial spirit,
British billionaire Richard Branson and former Vice President Al
Gore announced a contest to remove at least one billion tons of cardiscarding of motor vehicles in a manner "injurious to the comfort and happiness of individuals and the public").
5s9 See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
540 See Sch. History, Inventions that Fueled the Industrial Revolution, http://www.
schoolshistory.org.uk/IndustrialRevolution/inventions.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
541 See Moises Velasquez-Manoff, Unions See Greenbacks in "Green "Future: Organized Labor
is Joining Forces with Environmentalists to Push for an Eco-Fiendly Economy, CHRISTAN SCI.
MoNrroR, Jan. 25, 2007, at 13.
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bon dioxide annually from the atmosphere. 542 As a prize, Branson has
offered $25 million.5 43 Looking at the related potential for developing
clean, renewable energy sources to achieve national energy independence, one analysis by environmental and labor organizations
predicts that an annual investment of $30 billion for ten years would
trigger the creation of 3.3 million jobs and a $1.4 trillion increase in
544
the gross domestic product.
Beyond profit, there may even be an evolving sense of environmental patriotism,545 the notion of a civic duty to make our nation
stronger by protecting the wetlands, natural landscapes, and healthy
atmosphere that sustain us. In at least a small measure, perhaps these
developments can be attributed to Lucas, spawning a reinvigoration of
nuisance law, and a concomitant examination of the actions that
threaten critical environmental resources.

542 Kevin Sullivan, $25 Million Offered in Climate Challenge: Tycoon Hopes to Spur Milestone
Research, WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 2007, at A13 (discussing February 9, 2007 announcement by
chief of Virgin Atlantic Airlines and Virgin Trains).
543 Id.
544
Velasquez-Manoff, supra note 541.
543 See Christine Klein, Editorial, "Patriotism"Is Redefined by Environmental Conservation,
GAINESVILLE SUN, Apr. 22, 2007, available at http://www.gainesvillesun.com/article/2007
0422/EDITORIALS0101/704220310 (advancing notion of "environmental patriotism").
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